

DIMITRI UZNADZE SELECTED WORKS

COMMENTED BY
CONTEMPORARY
GEORGIAN SCHOLARS



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გამომცემლობა

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ISBN 978-9941-18-294-5



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Ilia State University Press
Tbilisi 2018

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Dimitri Uznadze Institute of Psychology

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Language editors:

Elene Tatishvili – *Preface*, Chitashvili, M.; *Philosophy of War*, Uznadze, D.; *Dimitri Uznadze and “Philosophy of War”*, Chitashvili, M.

Nana Bolkvadze – *Forms of Human Behavior*, Uznadze, D.; *Psychology and Pedagogy*, Uznadze, D.; *Dimitri Uznadze’s Work “Forms of Human Behavior”*, Mirtskhulava, R.; *Dimitri Uznadze on Education Issues: “Psychology and Pedagogy” and “Forms of Human Behavior”*, Makashvili, K.; *Dimitri Uznadze’s Theory of Set and the Unconscious Influence of the Experience Contents on the Actual Situation (“Priming”)*, Parjanadze, D.

Text Design: Ketevan Ghonghadze

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ISBN 978-9941-18-294-5

ILIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
3/5 Cholokashvili Ave, Tbilisi, 0162, Georgia

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PREFACE

Marine Chitashvili

It is a great honor for me to write about Dimitri Uznadze's scientific heritage, especially for the foreign academic community. The research project on Dimitri Uznadze's heredity, carried out at Ilia State University Psychology Institute aims critically assess the heritage of the Georgian school of psychology, document its achievements, and explore the scholarly legacy of Dimitri Uznadze, the founding father of Georgian psychology, from two perspectives: Uznadze's contemporary period including his active working years in psychology [1918-1950] and the present-day perspective, when some of his theoretical findings have become major objectives in contemporary psychology.

This collection offers four critical reviews of Dimitri Uznadze's selected works, including his non-psychological essay "Philosophy of War", published in 1914 in the Socialist Federalist Newspaper "Sakhalkho Purtseli". The other three papers review the scholar's psychological writings. The third comment is overarching overview of Uznadze's theory of set and concepts affiliated with memory, particularly priming. All reviews are based on the same principle: to demonstrate consistency of Dimitri Uznadze's works and the importance of his ideas and concepts for modern psychology.

Dimitri Uznadze's theory of set belongs to psychological theories of the unconscious. However, the scholar himself points out that the unconscious in the Freudian sense¹ is an unnecessary concept. Uznadze's set is an unconscious phenomenon preceding any behavior. According to the author, triggers of a behavior are rooted inside a per-

1 Understanding the unconscious, repressed content.

son, being inherently indivisible from the individual and, in general, are described by the concepts of demand category.

D. Parjanadze focuses on Uznadze's logic in the context of the theory of set: „... a living being is indifferent to the environment as long as it does not have any needs. However, as soon as a need arises, the environment influences it in a way that helps it meet this need. Thus, the environment turns into a situation in which the need is satisfied. This situation does not affect any single function but the agent as a whole. As a result, the convergence of the need and a situation favorable for this need forms a specific state – a set” (see pp. 113 in this book). D. Parjanadze discusses Dimitri Uznadze's theory of set in the context of priming, one of the central theories in contemporary cognitive psychology, and points out that the major concern of diverse and multisystem studies is the analysis of priming and its impact on the basis of general psychological theory. In her opinion, the set theory is an appropriate general psychological framework to serve this purpose.

The author of the review puts forward the following questions relating to priming: what is/are the psychological system(s) underlying priming; how priming affects human behaviors without being conscious; how priming is related to the control of behavior in general; how is it possible to conduct a behavior on the basis of simultaneous and parallel primings and how to resolve the conflict between them; when and how does priming emerge; whether individual differences influence priming. General psychology provides answers to all these questions. The author [D. Parjanadze] finds Dimitri Uznadze's theory appropriate in this respect, as according to the set theory, it is not a single function that acts, but the whole person who keeps all the information about the course of life, including his/her pre-conscious reflections. The theory also implies the instances of the unconscious level and appropriate capabilities in the interaction processes (see pp. 112-118 in this book).

Parjanadze relies on Uznadze's definition of human behavior: “Human behavior can be activated without a person's own cogni-

tive, emotional and volitional acts. It can be activated on the basis of his/her set which expresses not a particular psychic function but the whole of a person as such (Uznadze, 1961)” (see p. 114 in this book). Thus, set is unconscious and reflects all primary relationships of a living organism with the reality. All of the individual relationships do not disappear but are “stored” until a new situation activates the set with its multiple possibilities, which is then reflected in the behavior. This process can be regarded as an example of priming.

The author thinks that the theory of set provides a good basis to verify, complete and revise studies with respect to priming by generalizing the following provision, which proves to be relevant for the theory of set as well as for priming: provided set is the basis of behavior and is first reflected in an emotion, and at the same time, each primary set develops in to a fixed set and becomes latent, with a potential to actualize under appropriate circumstances, then the present situation is full of possibilities to base the behavior on priming and conduct it without conscious control.

R. Mirtskhulava’s (see pp. 95-102 in this book) and K. Makashvili’s commentaries are devoted to Dimitri Uznadze’s “Forms of Human Behavior” (see pp. 103-108 in this book). Mirtskhulava mainly considers the work in a psychological context, while Makashvili discusses the same paper from the interdisciplinary perspective of pedagogy and psychology.

Dimitri Uznadze’s “Forms of Human Behavior”, published in 1941, aims to define human behavior and identify classification principles of the behavior system. According to Uznadze, “behavior can be triggered by subjective demand and objective environment (object). Environment does not directly influence behavior; it affects the agent of the behavior and makes him/her ready for this behavior. The external reality, the object ... causes a relevant set” (see p. 95 in this book).

Uznadze divided behavior-triggering needs into two categories: the object and the functional needs, while behaviors caused by them are conventionally called exterogenic [object, substantial needs] and

introgenic [independent of the object, substantial needs, caused by activity, functionality need].

Uznadze calls the inherent universal need for activity a functional tendency which is activated by the momentum of the agent's forces. Exterogenic behaviors are consumption, care, service, curiosity, work and labor, while introgenic refers to play, having fun, aesthetic enjoyment, artistic creativity and sport. Learning is a form of behavior discussed separately, as it is an intermediate behavior between play and work, and has the signs of both types. According to Uznadze, in each particular case, subjective sense is the leading factor to determine whether a behavior is exterogenic or introgenic.

The author of the article finds that Uznadze's classification of behavior echoes the central issue of contemporary psychology, motivation and its characteristics, which are formulated today as an extrinsic motivation, as well as intrinsic motivation, which is important in personality, social, clinical and counseling psychology.

Mirtskhulava lists of contemporary authors whose works discuss the same issue and attempt to answer the following question: what is the feasibility of behavior in general when "intrinsic motivation is an element of motivation system that implies specific stimulation of an individual; the behavior stimulated by it is not aimed at a particular outcome; it lends itself to the positive emotional meanings and causes the processual and consequential positive feelings" (see p. 97-98 in this book). The author's main message is that the meaning of behavior is determined by the entity— a person — that triggers and motivates the behavior, and the person's internal activity that follows stages of development without changing in essence—thus, it is a person who creates the meaning of the behavior and not the environment in which this behavior occurs.

Makashvili critically reviews Dimitri Uznadze's findings at an overlap of psychology and pedagogy and explores opportunities for the development and application of the theories. It is pointed out that systems developed by a handful of distinguished teachers can not be broadly applied in the education system as they reflect the achieve-

ments of these teachers, without providing a research-based coherent theoretical and practical framework that would take into account the needs of a child as an active individual, his/her age-specific development, and the possible simultaneous effects of pedagogy, teaching and upbringing. Development of psychic functions and acquisition of knowledge is not a sufficient precondition to ensure a child's academic success. The main goal, which is the development of a child as an active and critically-minded person, may in fact fall beyond the scope of education and school... The author finds important the following opinion expressed by Uznadze: "... the common pedagogical practice to influence the psychic (i. e. directly target a child's mindset, emotions, and desires) in the process of adolescent development does not meet the expectations. Thus, the postulate of immediacy is useless and may even be harmful for pedagogy" (see p. 103-104 in this book). Makashvili points out that, according to Uznadze, it is necessary to study the active structure of a person (adolescent) in its entirety to ensure a positive pedagogical effect. Thus, the theory of set can be seen as a theoretical basis, as it represents the integrity characteristic of a person and his/her consolidated willingness to act (see pp. 103-108 in this book).

A teacher who anticipates a student's activity is committed to teach an active person and develop him/her into a true master. Teacher's profession, "craftsmanship", should have a systemic basis. A professional teacher is supposed to have a profound theoretical and practical understanding of the following: "*The role of critical thinking, the primacy of teaching and learning processes over actual knowledge, learning by doing, spontaneous sharing of knowledge in the process of learning, introduction of the evaluation for learning along with learning assessment, the development of the operational system for establishing self-regulation based on a holistic approach*" (see p. 105 in this book). The author of the article points out that these characteristics listed in Uznadze's 100-year-old essay and the related practices are among the central issues of modern pedagogy.

The review of Uznadze's non-psychological essay, the "Philosophy of War" (see pp. 121-135 in this book), attempts to pinpoint the

main postulates of the scholar's philosophy of religion and history, which further develop into his general psychological theory as reminiscent concepts.² They are: psychophysical parallelism and its rejection; the inherent functional tendency, which is the basis for a person's actions; general psychological theory of reasonable behavior; objectification and purpose of behavior; the impact of the past on the current behavior [priming]; primacy of intrinsic motivation in conducting a behavior; interpretation of the meaning of a behavior; the development vector and multifaceted structure of behavioral forms; activity, intrinsic motivation as a subject-actor's/agent's predicate.

I do hope that, thanks to this collection of papers, Dimitri Uznadze will appeal to present-day readers as a modern and interesting author and will attract increasing attention from academic circles.

2 Being the author of the review, I find it rather difficult, and in fact, almost impossible to distance myself from the work, which would enable me to summarize and present critically my own writing. These are my final comments on Uznadze's philosophical thought, which, I believe, is analyzed in sufficient depth in my article.

PART I

DIMITRI UZNADZE'S
WORKS

FORMS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR¹

Dimitri Uznadze

The concept of behavior is essential to psychology. Although Behaviorist psychology's claim that behavior is the main subject of psychological science cannot be regarded as reasonable in any way, it is still without doubt that this notion is truly important for exploring the psychical life. The thing is that, historically mental life emerged based on the interaction with environment, practice or behavior, and all the basic peculiarities that characterize it, all the laws of nature that occur, are created and developed during practice. Obviously, psychological research would be barren, if it did not take into account this underlying circumstance and did not pay due attention to the behavior. Abstract and metaphysical character of bourgeois psychology, its schematism and formalism and its ineffective actions towards understanding of specific mental reality are definitely caused by underestimation of this statement. It is out of question that the concept of behavior should be given a very special place in psychological science.

Nevertheless, there is still no final agreement on the basic psychological contents of this notion. Here, as in many other cases – and maybe even more – the correct solution of the issue is hindered by the fatal premise which represents the cornerstone of the bourgeois psychology, and in accordance to that, all of the mental and motor processes are in direct casual connection with each other and the en-

1 (Editor's note). This work was first published in 1941 as the 17th volume of "Tbilisis saxelmwipo universitetis shromebi" [Works of Tbilisi State University]. This version is translated from "Shesavali tanamedrove azrovnebashi" [Introduction to the Modern Thought]. (2007). (Part IV, pp. 150-185). Iliia State University Press.

vironment. According to this *immediacy hypothesis*, behavior occurs without essential participation of the subject or the individual as a concrete integrity; behavior is not characterized by the relationship between the environment and the subject itself, but person's certain mental and motor processes individually interact with the environment; it is initially determined by the immediate relationship of motor or psychic processes and their stimulus relationship, and therefore, in order to understand the behavior only consideration of these two members is sufficient. The subject itself, as a concrete integrity that establishes relationship with the environment in order to achieve its goals, the analysis of behavior based on this *immediacy hypothesis* completely disregards the subject and its needs as unnecessary elements. Therefore, not everything that represents the subject in the behavior – the senses or meanings – is inherent in the notion of behavior; here the subject becomes attached strange element that does not have any meaning for understanding the behavior. That is why an individual is totally excluded from the notion of behavior and the above-mentioned two members remain in place: processes or acts (mental and motor) and their stimuli. In short: Behavior is a stimulus and its response.

Let us consider the example: In the daily life, we use the term behavior, when, for instance, the student reads a book, the farmer weeds cornfield, Julius Caesar crosses the Rubicon, and Napoleon moves on to fight with Russia ... As we can see, this sequence of movements always occurs in some particular situation and it always meets certain needs of the subject. Unless the subject had this particular need and a certain situation existed, he/she would not conduct this particular act of behavior. Obviously, the sequence of movements becomes a genuine behavior only by these circumstances (need and situation).

Now let us ignore the subject with its needs, who conducts the above-mentioned behavior in a certain situation, in order to satisfy those needs. What will we get in result? Each case of behavior will lose its specific peculiarity and the only remaining difference between them will be the sequence of elementary movements in each particu-

lar case. Therefore, in this case, these elementary movements and not any given complexes pertinent to them must be considered as real behavior, but they are already very specific and therefore do not necessarily have to be studied individually.

What is the essence of these elementary movements? In all the above mentioned cases, we have the same circumstance in common – there is a particular stimulus outside the body's sensory surface that affects it. It causes a certain physiological process in the nervous fibers, which then spreads in the nervous center, where it passes to efferent nerves and finally causes muscular compression. Behaviorists believe that each particular behavior consists only of such elementary processes. Accordingly, when we come across with the specific act of behavior, it may only be considered as studied, when it is clear what elementary processes it consists of. American psychologist *Tolman* describes these elementary processes as *molecular* behavior, and the complex, concrete forms of behavior that we have mentioned above he named as *molar* behavior.

Therefore, behaviorist psychology believes molecular behavior is a true form of behavior. According to its belief, human life can only be considered scientifically studied if it is completely broken down into molecular behavior acts, thus discovering those genuine physiological processes which solely and truly occur in the body as a natural essence of behavior. But psychology could no longer be considered a behavioral science of a particular human being, because particular behaviors, as we know, always serve some need, contain definite purpose and meaning: psychology would become a reflex science, physiology. Therefore, it is clear: if it is possible to have the science of mental psychology of human beings, the behavioral, molecular understanding of behavior should be considered as aimless and intolerable, and the concept of molar behavior should be taken into consideration instead.

According to the Gestalt theory's basic principles, we definitely cannot say that the processes in the physiological field are, unquestionably, molecular processes, or that the molar phenomena do not exist here. Wertheimer's basic hypothesis, that was developed by W.

Kohler, and is known as *isomorphism*, proves that movement of brain atoms and molecules does not fundamentally differ from opinions and feelings, but as a molar aspect, as a phenomenon, is identical to them, so that physiological processes are also gestalt. Thus, only the following conclusion is derived from this again by *Koffka*: “If the physiological processes are expansive processes, and if they are molar instead of being molecular, then there is no longer a danger to omit molar behaviors in favor of molecular behavior”, and to bring the human behavior down to the meaningless processes.

Thus, according to Gestalt theory, it can be considered reasonable, that there is no molecular behavior in fact but only molar, and therefore psychology has the ability to study the true human behavior.

However, can we really think of the molar behavior of Gestalt theory as meaningful behavior? According to *Koffka*, human behavior should be considered more molar than molecular, because it is an expansive process that is not predefined by separated, local, totally independent connections, but by expansive *valley*, in which these processes are ongoing – not independent *neuralpasses in the body*, but wide *area*, with its dynamic influences and which *Koffka* calls the “*environment of behavior*”. The behavior has *meaning* only because it is the inevitable part of the whole structure of Gestalt, as it has a certain place and plays a certain role in it.

But it is impossible to speak about the sense and meaning of behavior without having in mind a goal of this behavior, at least it cannot be considered natural, and Gestalt theory is forced to take such a natural path. The reason is that those who connect this behavior with the active *subject* with particular needs, who does not even consider behavior without this subject, can only discuss the aim of behavior. The concept of behavior by Gestalt theory does not necessarily mean participation of active subjects. In order to understand the behavior according to the Gestalt theory, it is unnecessary to employ the concept of the subject. The decisive role is not attributed to the subject itself, but to the environment: the peculiarity of behavior is only predefined by the dynamics of the environmental forces; the environment *directly*

defines behavior as an expansive process, as a complex integrity, as a molar and not molecular content.

As we can see, Gestalt theory as well as Behaviorism, goes on defending the immediacy hypothesis position. That is why the concept of subject remains out of its doctrine, and the reasoning of the sense and meaning of behavior becomes so unnatural. Indeed, the concept of Gestalt theory has just as little to say about sense and meaning of behavior as the concept of behaviorism: in the Gestalt theory behavior is essentially the same as in the Behaviorist theory, it is purely mechanical process.

It cannot be said either that the molar nature of the behavior is sufficiently justified in Gestalt theory. The thing is that behavior can only be understood as molecular without the concept of an active subject, even though this behavior may be an expansive process, as in the case of Gestalt theory behavior. This is clearly seen from the following example: let us say that we see a subject who shaves a board. What kind of behavior do we have in this case? The Gestalt-theory would say that it is shaving. It would not be able to express the essence of behavior though. In this case, the subject may either work, study, play or have fun. He/She would be guided by completely different purposes and therefore, the behavior may be of substantially different types. While working, learning, playing and having fun are all different forms of behavior, as we assume below, the act of shaving may be presented everywhere. Therefore, taking into consideration only the movements, which are called shaving, is not enough to understand what kind of behavior we have in this case. Shaving is only a separate act that can be included in one behavior as well as in the other one. In this regard, it is more like a *molecule* of behavior than the whole behavior. It is clear, therefore, that behavior in Gestalt theory is more *molecular* than *molar*.

As we see, the problem of behavior cannot be solved based on the immediacy theory. Behavior is activity, and it is impossible to comprehend behavior without taking into account the substantial importance of the subject.

Every activity implies the relationship of the subject with the external reality, the environment. The subject has some specific need, and he/she acts upon the external reality in a certain direction in order to satisfy this need. That is how the behavior emerges. As we can see, it implies the necessity of the subject and his/her forces, on the one hand, and the environmental object, which must satisfy his/her need, on the other hand. Behavior is the reaction of subject's forces, and of course, its understanding is impossible without the requirements and the forces that satisfy his/her needs: these forces act in a certain way, because there is some need that can be satisfied by particular object. Therefore, what forces the subject uses and how he/she acts depends on the object that the subject needs and towards which his/her forces are directed: the object determines the type and activity of the behavior. The activity is always object-directed; the action without object would have been a chaotic, pointless process that no one could call behavior.

However, the object does not directly, reflexively define the act of behavior. This would only be possible if these acts existed independently, if they did not imply certain integrity, living being, or the subject whose individual acts they represent. However, the living being as a subject, the organism, is such an integrity, where the whole precedes the parts, where parts and particular phenomena originate based on subsequent differentiation of the primary integrity; the whole is not dependent on parts, but on the contrary, the parts depend on the whole subject. This means that the living organism, in order to make some kind of movement, some behavior or individual act, as a whole, must be in a completely different condition; i. e. each individual act of the behavior implies that individually determined subject as a whole is in a particular condition that determines this particular act of his/her activity, because the activity as a whole defines its parts. In order for the living thing to take a certain step, he/she as a whole, must get in a certain condition beforehand; if he/she has to take this particular step, then he/she as a whole should get a *disposition* to take this step.

How can the subject get a right disposition that is necessary for the appropriate behavior act, if the act is not visible yet, if he/she knows nothing about it yet? In a word, what determines the condition of the subject as a whole, which precedes his/her acts of behavior, what causes his/her disposition? The answer is obvious: the subject interacts with external reality, the object; the external reality, the object in the process of interaction has a direct effect on him/her that changes him/her as a whole and causes a relevant set as in the unity of forces.

Thus, the process of behavior is as follows: The subject with a certain need addresses the external objective reality to satisfy the need. Actually, the reality acts directly on the subject and causes a *set* to act towards the object that is necessary to satisfy the need. As a result, the subject conducts some kind of reasonable acts of behavior, i. e. he/she activates the forces, which should be considered as appropriate to the object, and he/she activates forces the way it is necessary for obtaining this object.

Therefore, the concept of set gives us an opportunity to understand why behavior is reasonable and relevant, i. e. at the same time, it considers both the subject and reality, corresponds to both of them; it makes clear why the forces participating in the behavior mean some certain object – in case of its existence they force us to act and they never create any real behavior without this object.

As we mentioned above, psychics have been emerged in the process of interaction with reality, practice or behavior and reached the level of its present development. It is clear that all attempts to examine it will be unproductive without taking into consideration this statement; therefore, the study of behavior issues is of utmost importance for psychology.

Among these issues the differentiation of the behavior is in the first place; first, we must classify the forms of behavior. If we do not know what kind of basic forms of the behavior exist, of course, we will not be able to study the human psychics in relation with its particular activity. In the present study, we attempt to provide such classification.

What should we take as a basis for the classification of human behavior forms? Since the concept of set has crucial role in human behavior, it is doubtless that the same role belongs to it here as well. However, the concept of set is not sufficient. The problem of the activity motivation or the activity source is also essential, and the decisive role here must be attributed to the concept of *need*. If we underline these concepts, we will see that the unity of human behavior consists of two main categories.

What are these categories?

Provided a person has a *need* and a certain object is required to satisfy it. For example, a person has a need to eat, and this need may be satisfied by certain product, such as bread. He/She is forced to activate the right forces dictated by the set of mind in this particular situation and which are necessary to get this object (e. g., bread). As we can see, the object, which causes a need appealing to the activity, determines the set and the behavior of the subject; in this case, behavior gets the impulses from the outside (from the object) and is managed by the set that is determined from the outside. Such behavior can be called *exterogenic*.

However, there can be a different situation too. There is an occasion that the subject does not have any material need, or so-called practical need which tends him/her to seek for means of satisfaction from the external reality. Therefore, he/she is no longer forced to exert influence on external reality. Nevertheless, that does not mean that he/she stays in a totally passive, inactive or defensive condition. The natural condition of a human being is active and he/she can only be inactive, and only relatively inactive, in the periods of rest. Therefore, it is not necessary to have any practical need in order to cause his/her activity; i. e. the requirement which should be necessarily satisfied by an object. He/She also has a need for *activity*, i. e. the need to activate forces and give them the direction that has been inactive for some reason, the need, which we can call *functional tendency*. In addition, in case a person is no longer forced to act in order to satisfy the practical needs, the functional tendency appears and a person continues to be

active. Here the activity, behavior is not already determined from the outside; it is derived from the inner impulse and is managed by the set that does not initially originate in the process itself, but it somehow comes from the subject's past. Here the behavior has an internal origin and is free from external forces. We call this behavior *introgenic* behavior.

Thus, two main categories of behavior should be separated from each other: *exerogenic* behavior and *introgenic* behavior. Each of them contains a range of independent forms of behavior. What are these forms of behavior?

1. As we know, it is characteristic for the *exerogenic* behavior that the necessity to satisfy any need activates the forces of the body: the object is always determined by the need here. In the case, the forces of organism can be activated in two ways: the first, when the object is given, but its assimilation is required to meet the need. In this case, the organism has to activate the forces that enable assimilation. For example, if the animal feels hunger, and the food is in front of it, it activates certain forces depending on the kind of food given, and the animal starts moving: it starts eating. When animal is thirsty, it moves differently: it *drinks*. All these are particular forms of animal behavior. Usually, it is called *consumption*.

Definitely, not only the eating and drinking movements constitute consumption in this case. For example, the animal is grazing. No doubt, the consumption of the grass is not only picking and grazing but that the animal gradually changes the place, gradually moves forward in order to find more grass. Let us say that a person drinks water: drinking is not only swallowing water, but it is also bringing the water to the mouth with his/her hands. In a word, the consumption behavior contains two main groups of movements: On the one hand, there are the movements of the consumer's body (bite, chew, and swallow) and, on the other hand, there are movements that are necessary for passing the object (e. g., food or drink) to consumption organs, for example, animal's movement in the direction of the grass or water.

These two groups entail movements of substantially different nature. The first one involves inherent movements that are partially automated and instinctive, and the other group mainly consists of the acquired movements or conditional reflexes. It means that the latter movements have much more complex structure than the first ones. Moreover, as far as they entail the acts that were acquired from animal's experiences, the level of their difficulty may vary.

Naturally, the question arises: At what point should all these movements be considered as the content of the new form of behavior?

Indeed, when a thirsty animal sees water it runs towards it to satisfy its needs. It can be said that its locomotion here is essentially the same as, for example, gradually changing place when eating grass; but the case is more complicated when the same animal is running far to the spring that is not even in its view to drink water. When the predator feels any animal that is far away, and when it defeats its prey after a severe fight, then it is doubtless that here we have more sophisticated acts. So, we may pose a question: Is this behavior still the consumption or is it another form of behavior? The situation becomes even more complicated or doubtful when we consider the behavior of bird nesting or fox digging a burrow. In this case, we are dealing with the act of behavior that has arisen based on need satisfaction. But is it a consumption act, or is it another, more complex behavior? When a hungry person kills the animal, skins it, makes a fire, roasts the meat and satisfies the hunger, there is a question: Does he/she work or is it only a complicated act of consumption?

Of course, it is difficult to give the answer to this question. If we put forward alternate question – is this case of consumption or work? It would be more appropriate if we decide in favor of the consumption. Anyway, we can see complex movements here, in the context of satisfying some of the current needs: the living being determines all these acts to meet particular actual needs. However, if we aim to find the right answer, then it will be much more correct to say that in essence it is neither the act of work nor the act of consumption.

There is no doubt that there are other forms of behavior even closer to the act of consumption than to work, but they are still different forms of behavior. We could say that they represent the acts that developed based on differentiation of the consumption behavior.

The differentiation of the consumption acts has been clearly defined in human life. It is therefore more appropriate if we analyze the behavior of the human being first. The essential biological needs of human beings are drinking and eating, and sexual needs. The immediate acts of satisfaction of these needs constitute the essence of consumption behavior. Nevertheless, other needs are still oriented on physical organism: it needs to be clean, warm, dressed up and so forth. All acts the immediate results of which are to satisfy these needs can be deemed as full analogues of consumption behavior. A person washes his/her face, brushes his/her hair is dressed or undressed when needed. All these acts are experienced as outcome of definite impulses of actual requirement – just like acts of eating and drinking, but the difference is still obvious: those are organism's internal needs, and these ones are experienced from peripheral areas of the same organism. Therefore, we distinguish these forms of behavior in common speech: the first one is named *consumption*, and the other – *self-care*. Both of them become gradually complicated along with the development of human being: new consumption acts are added to the existed ones, though they are experienced as outcome of the actual needs, still they are not directly connected with the satisfaction of these needs. Let us consider the example of man: he does not grab chicken and tear and chew meat with his teeth, but he finds a knife in advance, kills a chicken, lights the fire, uses the utensils, fries the chicken, and only after these acts, he starts immediate act of consumption. The same is true when it comes to self-care: he often addresses quite difficult acts in these cases too. On a relatively high level of development, he skins the animal, cuts the skin, sews it and then wears it. The basic set is the same: He has some urgent need and he makes complex movements to meet his needs, maybe these movements are not directly satisfying the actual needs, but they form a complex that is required to satisfy these

needs, and they only have value and purpose, if there exists a need and a necessity to satisfy it. This form of behavior of human beings is called *self-service* in common language.

In principle, we have the same situation when the person is not confined with the sense of his/her own personal needs, but also with the needs of his/her extended personality. Wife or son, father and mother, in a word, family – this is the primary form of extended personality. Self-care and self-service take the form of someone else's care and service for an extended personality.

Thus, the form of *consumption* behavior appears based on the need impulse coming out of the human body. The actual sense of the peripheral need of the same body is the basis of another behavior – *self-care*. However, there are complicated acts of behavior that occur based on the experience of same actual need; they are indirectly defined by the satisfaction of the same need. This is the third form of behavior, so-called *self-service*; when the subject is in his/her expanded personality, he/she, primarily, experiences the family needs and family members concerns, and completes the acts of *other people's care* and *service of others*.

All these forms of behavior are unified in a family group of *consumption behavior*. The characteristic of the whole group is that the value and the sense of each behavioral act is defined by the satisfaction of the actual need: the results of these behavioral acts are valuable in subject's sense, everything is valuable and reasonable until they serve the satisfaction of the actual need experienced at particular moment. As soon as this goal is reached, as soon as the need is satisfied, these behavioral acts and everything that these acts create or give lose their significance. In addition, for the subject they cease existence. It can be said that their time is confined by the time required for the satisfaction of actual need: the time of their existence ends psychologically as their value and meaning end. In short, it can be said that the general characteristic of all these forms of behavior is that each of them only occurs and continues until the impulse and need causing it is still urgent.

If we keep in mind all these opinions, then we will have to dis-

cuss another form of behavior applicable to the same group. A human being is not only concerned with needs related with physical body. Other needs and requirements that have emerged in result of his/her social development and which are not related with his/her physical organism but with the complicated psychic life are also specific for him/her. Among these needs the well-known and especially characterized for man is *intellectual* need, *curiosity* expressed in all its possible forms at higher levels of development, and finally is experienced as the *thirst for knowledge*. There is no doubt that a person is forced to develop a rather complex activity within certain limits in order to satisfy this need. In any case, it is goes without question that the activity we have started based on thirst for knowledge has a small share in our behavioral inventory. A careful analysis confirms the existence of two different behavior forms.

Let us say that I would like to learn something: here we can choose one of two essential ways of information enquiry: a) I can ask someone about the thing that is the object of my interest. We mean that he/she can satisfy my curiosity: he/she already has the information prepared in advance and gives it to me. In this case, my activity is limited to finding right person with the information and asking him/her the right questions and, secondly, I perceive the information (I hear or read it), and I digest the information. Such activities are very frequent in our everyday life: we want to learn world news and we read daily newspapers. We would like to get accurate information about some of the spheres of reality and we read the relevant scientific books and researches for this purpose or, more often, we speak with our acquaintances and neighbors, and in a conversation we frequently address “*what*” and “*why*” questions.

b) But there is another way: instead of getting ready information from someone else and satisfy my thirst for knowledge, I apply my energy to find out the desired information myself. For this reason, I will be forced to do my own research, and gain genuine knowledge experienced by my own mind instead of verbal knowledge. This type of activity is not rare in our life as well.

Following question arises: What form of behavior do we have in this case? Our analysis clarifies that, firstly, there is a need (thirst for knowledge) and then comes act of the subject, which serves the purpose of immediate satisfaction of this actual need. All these are signs that characterize so-called behavior of the *consumption*. This circumstance gives us the right to conclude that in analogue situation we have a particular kind of consumption behavior. We do not see the principle difference between the usual consumption and curiosity acts, the only specific feature of the latter is that the physical acts do not play the leading role here, but psychic ones, in particular – the intellectual acts. For this reason, it will not be appropriate to unify curiosity satisfaction acts in the group of general types of consumption (eating, drinking, satisfying sexual needs); it would be more appropriate if we classify them as a separate form of behavior that is typologically similar to consumption behavior and is more close to aesthetic taste.

2. The second basic form of exterogenic behavior acts is work. The consumption, care, and service acts often get very complicated forms, while work is sometimes so simple in nature and content that it is hard and sometimes even impossible for the observer to distinguish these forms of behavior from each other. For example, someone is cutting wood in the forest and trying to build a bridge. Does he/she work or is it a self-service activity? It is impossible to solve this issue from the viewpoint of the observer, therefore, we must think as the subject himself/herself. Let us say this person is a hunter. He/She got to the spring in the woods, which he/she was unable to jump over, and he/she needs to hunt on the other bank. He/She tries to cut the tree and throw it to the other bank. He/She has a certain need, which is currently actual: he/she should move on to the other bank and that is why he/she acts this way. He/She does not have the goal to go back the same way or use the improvised bridge at any other time. He/She makes a bridge, moves on to the other bank, and that is it. From now on, the bridge that he/she has made is no longer a bridge for him/her. It has lost every sense and value: it played a role and thus its meaningful existence ended. Nobody would say that the subject was really

engaged in a labor act. Perhaps all will agree that it was more the act of self-service than the work act.

However, the situation changes, as soon as we imagine that the subject was not only guided by the impulse of his/her actual need, but with the intention to build long-lasting thing, or at least something that would be valuable for a period of time. In this case, a tree on the water would be separated from the subject's actual needs, from the specificity of the situation and it would be a realization of certain *idea*, definite concept of *bridge*. In this case, the tree on the water, from now on the bridge, would become the object of the "over-subjective" and "over the timely" value. The efforts of the subject would not be caused by bare impulse to satisfy the current need, but also the purpose of creating the *product of objective value*.

Of course, obviously it would be completely unjustified if we called this behavior consumption, care or service. There is no doubt that it would be the fact of work.

Hence, it is characteristic of work behavior that it is aroused without the impulse of the subject's actual need, and at least the value created in the process is out of the specific limits of this need: *Work creates products of objective significance and sense*. Therefore, this kind of behavior is only possible for a subject who has the idea of objective value, thus can overcome the specific objective limits and is able to reach implicit meaning – in short, for the subjects with capability of conceptual thinking.

Nevertheless, it would have been a mistake to think that the intention of creating an object of "over-subjective" and "over the timely" value is a characteristic feature of work behavior only. Below we will discuss the forms of behavior that are completely inappropriate to be called work, but we will see that they also have this feature. No! Work is also characterized with the fact that it is always related to some need, as the value created in working process always intends to satisfy this need. The only difference from the forms of consumption, care, and service behavior is, in this regard, this specific, current need that represents the impulse for these forms of behavior, while in the case of work, the idea of need fulfills this role. With this in mind, we could

say that the consumption, care and service acts are always the acts involved in the specific, individually defined needs, while the work contains the indeterminate acts, exempt from the individual needs.

However, if so, then it is clear that consumption, care and services are built on instinctive tendencies, while work is essentially based on the level of development of will power: the formers are instinctive and the latter is based on the will.

From this point of view, work behavior implies the existence and participation of social environment and social experiences. Because the idea of objective value, the conceptual thinking and the will – all these are the forms of activity that only emerges on the basis of social conditions: Robinson on his deserted island, in his lack of social environment can only partly be a workable subject as he is still equipped with a sense of mind, will and social experience.

It is superfluous to talk about the fact that there is no place for work in animal world. Animals, first of all, are characterized by, consumption act and then by the elements of the care and service. However, you may say, if the bird is nesting it creates product of particular value. Therefore, it works. This is true only for the external observer. Nevertheless, it is enough to look at the internal side of this “labor” in order to make it clear that it would be completely unjustified to call it work. As we know, Marx also noted that the animal is often driven by instincts even in its most difficult behavior acts, but man uses pre-created idea as a guideline for its realization through work.

However, it is also true that the nest is valuable for birds only for the individual needs and within a certain period – it has purpose only in the context of this time and these individual needs. When building its nest, the bird is guided by the impulse of the current demand alone, not by the *idea* of its need, not by the idea that it or other birds will use the nest in the future, because such need is not only natural for it, but other birds too. In general, the bird does not have any idea of need, the idea neither of others nor of time: it lives in practical reality, and the latter exists just as much as it is related to its actual demand; it is ignorant of objective reality as an objective value. Therefore, it is not

surprising that it has neither the idea of past nor that of future. Consequently, in these conditions, the nest is meaningful only in the context of the actual demand, and without this context, it is as neutral and unrealistic as every other thing in this surrounding reality that does not take part in the process of satisfaction of its needs and therefore is practically inactive.

Thus, the construction of the nest is more closely associated with consumption than with the work act.

The same is true about squirrels that prepare meal stocks for winter. The impression is that the animal is not guided by the actual need, but with the idea of future needs: as it is known, it does not eat everything that finds but collects part of it in one place and leaves there until the winter comes. Although this picture of the animal behavior looks like the behavior driven by the idea of the future, it certainly does not differ much from the usual animal behavior. The squirrels are not guided by the idea of future, and the nuts they gather for the winter do not really mean the *stock*, can be seen in the well-known senseless behavior that the captive squirrel conducts: it behaves as if it collects the nuts, even though this behavior does not make sense here.

The above mentioned, first of all, concerns the concept of physical work only. Naturally, new issue arises, whether physical work should be considered the only real work or not. Does the so-called mental work truly represent a special form of behavior? When it comes to physical work, it repeatedly applies to mental operations: genuine, productive, and human work acts would be impossible without a significant involvement of thinking; No one would consider it work otherwise. For productive physical work it is necessary to consider the characteristics of the material, the operation of the weapon and the techniques. The subject faces number of issues, which, in the first place, require the activation of his/her mental forces. However, all this cognitive activity, in the context of physical labor, is organized by set of tangible product creation. In result, all these activities, both mental and physical, are experienced as physical work activities.

Nevertheless, at the higher level of human development, the mental components of work acquire a certain degree of independence: they separate from concrete work processes and act like having a self-worth. There are separate fields of science that seek to solve cognitive problems in the physical labor process: the examples are technical scientific disciplines. Then the developments expand further and human cognitive acts become related not only to the problems of physical work, but also to the problems, which are no more directly connected with the work process. Many theoretical scientific fields emerged, which serve the satisfaction of the intense interest of human knowledge.

Thus, cognitive interest transforms into an independent need that requires complex mental activity for its satisfaction as we can see in the case of intellectual need. What forces are included and how they operate in each particular case do not depend on these forces, but on the nature of the problem itself. Therefore, in this case we are dealing with an exogenous form of activity.

However, is there an intention to produce goods just like in case of work behavior? A process of this activity does not satisfy actual interest, which requires the process of mental activity, so that is why we considered it an exogenous form of behavior. No, this interest requires only the result that is achieved in the process of intellectual activity.

This result is received in the form of idea or statement about the sphere of investigating reality, and at this extension, it can be deemed as a work of mental activity. Usually, this statement comes in an objective manner: the scientist expresses it in the word form – in writing or in oral form (for example, in the form of a book). However, the product of mental activity had been already presented before its final verbal-written form was ready. Mental work finds its meaning and value in this product. Thus, there is no substantial difference in terms of the created product.

In result of these discussions, it should be fair to admit, that mental activity is normally called work, namely, *mental work*. Therefore,

we have the right to conclude that the so-called *mental work* really exists.

3. There is a great number of professions, which does not intend to create any product of work. In spite of this, they create the meaning of life of a large group of people. We can think of *transport* occupations for example. The driver, who stays in his/her car from morning to afternoon, is driving through several kilometers per day; he/she undoubtedly does not produce any work product: he/she only changes destination places of values created by others. Of course, the driver does not spare his/her energy in vain. His/her profession is just as essential to the public as the profession of manufacturer, but since the driver's profession does not participate directly in the creation of the work product, the question may be as follows: Is the driver "working"? Maybe this favorable usage of his/her energy belongs to different form of human behavior?

When we have specific case of the material transportation, that is the raw material for production, then the transport can be considered as a participant of the production process: it also creates a product of work. However, in the concept of transport, of course, we do not necessarily mean that it only concerns the material.

There are not only luggage but also the passenger trains or cars, and the luggage itself may not constitute raw materials only but also ready-made products. Therefore, transport is not a *direct* participant of the production. However, you may be able to participate *casually* in the production process.

So what is transport?

In the wild world, we see the primitive forms of transport: when the hawk catches chicken, it does not directly eat it, but it will carry it somewhere later to eat there. When the wolf steals the sheep, it also behaves the same way. We can address a simpler example from the lives of people: when I take bread and bring it to the mouth, this can be considered as an elementary form of transport. Of course, in this latter case, we cannot speak about the work. We know that it belongs to the group of behavior acts that we call *services*.

Accordingly, *transport* should be considered as one of the main types of services. However, at the high level of social life development – at the labor distribution level– it is usually treated separately. As an outcome, subjectively for a person who produces it, it differentiates from the idea of a specific need and becomes an independent value: in this case, the transport worker does not meet the specific needs of some person but works for these independent values. In result, for the subject the transportation gains all features which are characteristic of work: it is fully experienced as work.

What we said about transport can be *mutatis mutandis* repeated for many other acts. Just one example: Let us say someone fell into the water and is drowning. The second person rushes out in the waves and tries to save him/her: after hard and long struggle, he/she takes him/her on the shore. What should we say about this incident? We say that we are certainly dealing with self-sacrifice, heroism here. However, what kind of behavior is it? Was the swimmer working when he/she struggled against waves to save human life or was he/she conducting other form of behavior in this case?

In principle, there is no doubt that we are dealing with the same kind of behavior that we have named *care*: Only someone who thinks of others as himself/herself can conduct the self-sacrificing behavior.

However, the acts of care are gradually becoming independent along with the complication of life. They become *valuable themselves* as if the person, who is owner of the acts of care, is meaningless: the position of particular person is substituted by an idea of common human being; so it becomes possible to transform care behavior into separate profession. Today, such a professional really exists – a swimmer who is hired in the designated place and is ready to jump into the water and to save someone.

Thus, we can conclude that at the higher level of the development of society, both care and service acts psychologically lose their dependent nature, get objective value and become experienced by the subject as work activities.

However, are these behavior acts losing their specific peculiarity and become experienced just as ordinary acts of work or any other inherent features shape them into psychologically different form of behavior?

When the subject prepares material in order to create a product with an independent value, i. e. when he/she works in the true sense of the word, he/she is inwardly directed towards these products – his/her mind is captured by the idea of product. Moreover, when the driver works or swimmer saves someone he/she does not aim so much for the product, but for the behavior, such as transfer of the material or survival of the human being. Therefore, according to the usual speech patterns, the name of this form of conduct is more *business* than the work: the *business* is done in the service and care processes, not the product of work. This circumstance gives us the grounds to think that psychologically in this case we have a different kind of work that can be called not work, but *activity or business*.

If we look through the general category of behavior that we have named exterogenic, we will see that it consists of two main different forms of dominant behavior in which some different but dependent behavior forms are united. As we have assumed, the first is *consumption* and the second is *work*. Next to the first one we should place *care and service* (for himself/herself and for others), and next to the other one – mental *work and business*.

As mentioned above, we call all these forms of behavior exterogenic, because here the impulse of human activity is derived from need. In addition, what kind of activity this should be, i. e. what should be the object of internal forces that are put into effect, depends on the nature of this need: the object of our forces is not dictated by the strength of the forces but by the need itself. The actions of the exterogenic behavior are therefore acts of forced behavior.

However, the treasure of human forces is not limited to those forces, which are motivated and activated at the particular moment by the particular need: No, we have other forces and other functions in our disposal. The notion of *functional* tendency that we discussed in other contexts makes it clear that the function, internal force, has the

ability to trigger the activity not only with the impact of the need, but also autonomously. In this case, the object, which is meant by each of these forces, is not intrinsically given to the subject or his/her forces, but is defined inwardly and autonomously. In this case, as we already explained above, we are dealing with separate types of action. These forms of behavior are the second major category of human behavior, that we mentioned above and called *introgenic*.

The following question is: What forms of behavior do we have in this second group of behavioral forms?

Some time ago, I published a work on the theoretical concept of playing, according to which playing should be placed among the forms of human introgenic behavior. The oldest question regarding the reason and the way a child plays finds its final solution in concept of the functional tendency. This means that the internal forces of the child are not affected by the actual impact of substantial need but by its inner impulse. The object, without which there is no possibility for any action, does not originate from the external need but from the inner self, from the forces set for the action. Therefore, playing is not an exterogetic but rather introgenic form of action, as playing is a form of spontaneous enactment of all the forces of human and their inherited complexes, it is doubtless that playing is the most *general* type of behavior. Not only the separate complexes of forces begin the action, which are formed in one form of behavior, but inter-functional complexes matching all the other forms of behaviors: All the above mentioned possible human behaviors – consumption, care, service, work and business can be used as the objects of the playing. Even the superficial observer knows that every possible form of human activity is found in the child's playing. These activities do not necessarily serve the satisfaction of needs, but the actual complexes of certain forces and the impulses of their functional tendencies. That is why playing has a great objective sense: that is why according to *Gross*, it is the real “anticipatory school” of life.

However, playing is a form of child behavior. As it is known, playing is the essence of life in the period of early childhood. No other

forms of behavior, especially exterogenic behavior, are present at this age, at least they are very weak. The only exception is consumption behavior, but it is only presented by its inborn motor contents. Playing can be seen as an exception among the forms of adult behavior: it is a childhood specific, and when it emerges in adult in its pure form, there is no doubt that it is the renewal of childhood rudiment.

That does not mean that the adult is characterized only by the actions of the exterogenic behavior. No! His/Her activity is frequently predefined by functional tendency. In any other way it would be impossible to satisfy the need for activity with the activities aimed to satisfy other needs. On the contrary, there are occasions that human forces are allowed to make only partial and one-sided actions for everyday needs. In these circumstances, while the other forces of a person have power, it is doubtless that he/she will feel the impetus of enactment and will find and create the relevant object. It will be necessary for him/her to activate these forces. Therefore, there is no doubt that adult should also have the forms of introgenic behavior: without these – and with exterogenic activity alone – the development of human forces will probably be unilateral: “free play of forces” is absolutely necessary for a human being.

However, if it is not in the form of playing, then what form does this “free play of forces” have in the adult life? What kinds of introgenic behavior can be found in the life of grown-up?

Of course, all these behavior forms can be found in the moments of human life when he/she does not show much care for his/her serious needs, actually, when he/she is not busy. There is no doubt that for the rest of his/her free time he/she does not only sleep: often he/she is awake, but free from everyday care, and he/she “does” something, but what does he/she do?

More often, he/she is *having fun*. *Having fun* does not mean laziness; it is, of course, one of the forms of behavior. Often we do not distinguish the entertainment from playing. Indeed, sometimes people entertain when they are playing. However, does that mean that he/she cannot have fun without playing, and are play and entertainment the

same? It happens that the person has fun when he/she reads, goes to a theater, a concert or a cinema, sings or dances, or even walks, speaks with his/her acquaintance or plays chess. Of course, playing is not the only way to have fun: entertainment is more than playing. Nevertheless, playing itself also is not just having fun. How can we understand the entertainment, and is it really a peculiar form of behavior?

As it is known, one of the effects of playing is having fun, and this fact indicates that there is something common between them. Playing is a spontaneous free action of human forces. Neither entertainment is a passive condition: it is a kind of activity, but there is absolutely no compulsion, it is not caused by the impetus of everyday needs, but it is a free and voluntary activity. Therefore, it is not an exterogenic behavior but one of the forms of introgenic behavior: both playing and its impulse are derived from functional tendencies.

However, this is the only thing that it has in common with playing. On the other hand, there is a visible difference between them. As mentioned above, playing is one of the general forms of behavior: the forms of the exterogenic behavior can become the content of playing. That is why playing always resembles a form of serious behavior: it is a “play” of serious human life; it is the so-called “performance”. Real playing is always a play of *illusion*. Entertainment is a very different thing. Here we have a different situation: there is no representation, imagination, illusion. Here, everything that is done is inherently the same as it is phenomenally. Let us take an example of reading a book. It may be a content both for playing and for an entertainment. In the first case, the child is not really reading the book, but he/she seems “as if he/she is reading it”. In the second case, we *really* read it, but not for any serious need to acquire knowledge or satisfy aesthetic need, but only to read, to feed our spiritual forces, to give content to the internal functions, to enable them to be activated. Alternatively, when we sing, dance, walk, play chess or speak with someone, do we “perform” anything? Do the song, dance, chess and speech mean anything other than it is? There are such phenomena as a genuine song, true dance,

and real chess. In the case of playing, it would not be so: there will always be sort of “singing, dancing or conversation”.

Thus, we can say that entertainment involves such acts that are similar to playing, due to the fact that they are caused by impulse of functional tendencies. However, it achieves its purpose by its phenomenological contents and not by imitating the “meaning” or “significance”. The act of having fun is always relaxing but we cannot say the same about playing.

There is another specific form of behavior close to entertainment, the elements of which we can observe in early childhood and which we name *sport*. We frequently do *sports* to have fun; but in the same way as in case of playing, this statement does not give us enough information to distinguish these forms of behavior. The point is that the general feeling of the subject is different in both cases and psychologically it is already sufficient reason to consider them as different forms of behavior.

What do we mean when we speak about sports? The first of all, sport deals with motor functions. Their primary purpose is always to serve a goal or need of any kind: there is no value for motor functions themselves. It is so clear for human being that he/she usually believes every movement is inevitably caused by any external reason or purpose. The movement itself, as a spontaneous act, seems for him/her difficult to understand. According to the widespread belief, any movement can be finally brought down to the reflex. So-called reflexology is the ultimate development of this view: it believes not only a motor function, but also other human functions are reflex type movements. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the living organism, especially the human, often creates the complexes of some quite difficult movements, when there is no external reason for them. In this case, the impulse should be in the function itself or in the subject himself/herself. *K. Bühler* has emphasized that the functionality – especially of the motor functions – is the pleasure itself. He believes that this so-called *pleasure of function* becomes an independent motor that enables the human motor to function even when there is no biological

need to activate these functions. Therefore, motor acts can have an independent genesis. If we remove elements of hedonism from this definition by *Bühler*, it can be considered as an important scientific achievement. Then the right kernel of this statement should be quite different. The motor function can indeed have an independent character, but not just imaginable as it turns out according to *Bühler* but truly independent. We should seek for internal motor inside of it, not in the consequent results that follow it. The pleasure of function, as a causal impulse, cannot precede the activation of motor function. It can only be the outcome of this function. However, if it only emerges in result of the function activation it principally cannot be regarded as its the motor: we had to have the first case in the life of the organism when motor function was activated and when the pleasure of function was still unknown to him/her. But what was the prerequisite for the function activation? Obviously, the function of the movement itself contains activation impulses: the function strives to put itself into the action; it has a tendency to function.

It explains that people often make movements without externally predetermined aim and purpose: the movement seems to be activated for movement itself and not for something else. In this fact, we are dealing with the impulse of self-sustaining of the function of movement. But the self-sustaining of the movement also means its development and it is clear that human, due to his/her consciousness, understands the impulse of the functional tendency of his/her motor apparatus and creates special conditions for its demonstration and activation: he/she creates the appropriate external conditions or the object for his/her inner forces tendencies. When a person is free from his/her everyday burden, when he/she has enough spare time, he/she has the opportunity to make allowance for functional tendency of his/her motor apparatus and give it a chance to reveal. He/she moves: runs, jumps, lifts heavy weights, plays football, swims, skates... He/she sees that his/her motor apparatus is improving gradually and he/she calls this doing the *exercise*, and as far as the training means improving and strengthening the function and this result is more appar-

ent when comparing with others, then the idea of competing and the impulse of competition become important in human life. This is how the functional tendency turns into *exercise* and the latter turns into competition and *sport*.

However, it would be a mistake to think that this is true just about the motor apparatus and its functions. The same is true for all other functions, namely, mental functions; sport is not dedicated only for the functions of the body but for the mental functions too: for example, if football is the part of the concept of motor sports, chess is also sports, even if participation of motor apparatus is minimal here.

Thus, when the subject creates conditions for re-operation in order to measure and train any of its functions he/she becomes a subject of independent form of behavior – the *sports*.

Elements of the sport are found in the early childhood, when the child does body exercises in the first year of his/her life: he/she repeats one and the same movements – tries to stand or walk, in *Bühler's* terms, he/she is engaged in a functional play. We think that he/she does not play but conducts basic acts of sports behavior. However, on the higher level of development – namely, at school age – similar movements are accompanied by the ability to examine the function and to train it, the sport behavior gains more specific form.

Ch. Bühler, by the way, thinks that sports is one of the stages of development of playing. We see that this is not the case. It is true that the initial elements of the sport are also found in early childhood. However, we should take into consideration that small child has not finally shaped behavior and in general, the forms of behavior are rudimental, developing and differentiating. Therefore, the distinct separation of sports from small child's other forms of behavior is very difficult. However, it is still possible to find some acts in the child's behavior, which should be considered as origins of sport (and not playing).

What is artistic creativity? Is it one of the types of work and therefore belongs to the exterogenic forms of behavior or, maybe, it belongs to introgenic ones? Artistic creativity always ends with a work *product*, unless no one could call it creativity as far as creation

means to bring something into existence. In this respect, there is no difference between artistic creation and work. If we add that this work product has also an objective value and therefore must meet certain needs, then the boundary between artistic creation and work seems vanished. Nevertheless, it is important and symptomatic that nobody calls artistic creativity work: this name does not adapt to work acts and it would feel awkward if anyone called creative acts work. Our speech feels the difference between the types of behavior.

Where is this difference and how is it justified?

When a person starts to work, first, he/she has a product of his/her work in mind that must satisfy some need. The ability to satisfy the need is the leading aspect that gives meaning and value to the whole work act. The person works because he/she considers some need that should be satisfied only via creation of certain product that will have the ability to satisfy certain need. That is why he/she has to activate the forces which will enable him/her to create the product that can satisfy the need.

There is completely different situation in the case of artistic creativity. We cannot say that the artist has a need of some kind of aesthetic pleasure and he/she is trying to create an artistic work that would satisfy this need. If the case was to satisfy the aesthetic need then, perhaps, the momentum of his/her own artistic creativity would never have emerged. In such a case, it would be natural if the artist found the works of others and satisfied his/her need. This behavior is common for each person and, in particular, the artist himself/herself when there is necessity to satisfy aesthetic needs. He/she goes to the art gallery to look at truly artistic works of prominent artists, he/she enjoys the poetry of Goethe or Rustaveli and does not begin to paint a drawing or write a poem in order to satisfy his/her aesthetic need through his/her own work. No, it is impossible that the impulse of artistic creativity derives from the need for aesthetic pleasure while the aspect of need satisfaction is the determining factor for work.

Where should we look for the impulse of artistic creativity? It will not be difficult to answer this question if we address the second issue,

namely: what does the artist pursue in his/her creativity, if creating an artistic work that will satisfy his/her aesthetic need is not the main thing for him/her? In what case does the artist feel satisfied with his/her artistic creativity and, therefore, what does artistic work serve if not the need for aesthetic pleasure? Artistic creativity is not called artistic because its artwork has normally figurative content and because it makes an adequate expression of something objectively existent. If that were the case, then the best art would be photography. Of course, even though photography is an expression of reality, nobody thinks it is an art. No! The art is not objectively dedicated to the purpose of resembling the objects but it intends to express the intimate mood of the artist: art is a form of expressing the inner self and therefore it does not create the photographic reproduction of reality but creates new forms of reality as the objectivation of the sets of artist's personality. However, if artistic work is the objectivation of intimate feelings of the creator then it is the enrichment of reality, the creation of new reality.

However, if that is true, then it is easy to understand what drives the artist when he/she engages in artistic creativity. There is no doubt that we must seek the impulse of artistic creativity in the expression of set of the artist, and therefore in his/her strive to their completion and realization. Artistic creativity is a fight for adequate expression of the artist's set and, obviously, the more successful the fight is and the more artistic ways the artist finds the more satisfying the artistic process is.

It is evident that artistic creativity is one of the forms of behavior, which derives its impulse from the functional tendency and therefore, the place of which must be found among the forms of introgenic behavior. As in entertainment, sports and playing the sense of pleasure and satisfaction is not caused by the result of the activity but the process itself. The same is the case in the artistic creativity: all these forms of behavior have a process character.

Nevertheless, artistic creativity is quite distinct from the rest of the introgenic behavior. The product, the work result has more significant role for the process and nature of the whole behavior here than in any other case. How a functional tendency finds satisfaction here

depends on the final product of the creative process; how satisfying the process part of creativity is for the subject eventually depends on adequate representation of the subject's internal feelings in an artistic work. The idea of the latter does not only determine every moment of creative process but calls for ending and finishing it. The process of artistic creativity loses its value if it is finished before the artistic product is ready; the same is not true for playing: every section of the process has its own independent value and that is why it is possible to cease it at any moment both in principle and factually. The process has its value in entertainment and sports too. Of course, there is nothing to say about creating any kind of product; instead, the main thing here is the *success*, which in the case of sports is marked as a *record*. Essentially, it plays a role of the product but the difference is that it is a sign of the act itself, of function itself and not the result that we get as a product of functional activation. That is why sport also has a pure process character. Artistic creation, accordingly, is closer to the work process. Nevertheless, as we confirmed above, it should still be considered as a form of process behavior.

The widespread theory of artistic creativity is known as *Schiller* and *Gross*' theory, according to which art should be derived from playing. Since both artistic creativity and playing are forms of behavior that originated on the basis of unrealized sets and functional tendencies, this theory is based on a sound viewpoint. However, as far as they are the specific behaviors and also very different from each other, there should be nothing more in common between them. We already had a chance to compare playing and artistic creativity. Then we saw that these forms of behavior significantly differ from each other. This statement may become clearer if we consider following example: let us say the children are playing a "war play". Now let us say, for example, they are trying to present war on a stage. Will it be the same behavior in both cases? No doubt, it will be substantially different. In the first case, playing proceeds smoothly; each participant decides what to do within definite but a very wide range of behaviors. The participant's behavior is optional. He/she can leave the play when he/she

wants: neither importance nor sense of his/her play will be lost. However, when he/she takes part in a war performance on the stage, his/her behavior loses freedom; it is strongly determined by maximum adequacy of the performance of war on the stage. If he/she wants to take part in the performance, he/she cannot stop playing when he/she wants otherwise it will transform into a simple play instead of a dramatic art work. The tendency to match the adequate performance of the war gives behavior very foreseeable, forced shape, while in the case of usual "war play" each moment of playing itself has an independent value, it does not essentially define the whole and is not essentially defined by the whole. This example illustrates that psychologically the "performance" or artistic creativity and the play differ substantially from each other. Although in both cases acting or self-activity is in the center of the interest of the participants, this activity is psychologically independent at each given moment of playing, and in artistic creativity it is inseparable part of the whole and is determined by the whole from the beginning to the end. In playing there are separate acts of behavior which themselves possess some value, in the artistic creation they are only a possibility to serve the idea of expressing the whole. In spite of this, the subject conducts the acts of behavior because he/she feels the impulse for conducting these acts defined by whole.

What about aesthetic pleasure? No doubt, people often feel a certain need, which can be satisfied by contemplation the beauty of the artistic creativity works or the beauty of nature. The aesthetic pleasure is the state when the subject satisfies this need. As in the case of other common needs satisfaction we should also distinguish between two categories of acts here. Firstly, the acts of need satisfaction (in the case of aesthetic pleasure – contemplating artistic work) – and secondly – the complex of acts that create conditions for realization of the above mentioned acts (in the case of aesthetic pleasure – purchase of theater ticket, going to the theater, finding a place and etc.). This makes clear that aesthetic pleasure belongs to the forms of behavior which we named above – the *consumption*. Nevertheless, if we observe the essence of aesthetic pleasure we will make sure that it is still

quite different from the usual acts of consumption. Let us take the example of eating behavior. The subject needs food: his/her organism requires some substance (food). The need is satisfied by transferring the substance into the body and assimilating it. As for the acts that are necessary for this (bite, chew, etc.), these acts do not take part directly in the satisfaction of the need. Satisfaction of the need of a hungry body is also possible without these acts. If we directly provide the organism with food without applying the acts of feeding, the need will be still satisfied: it is well known that the organism can be sustained for a long time by the artificial feeding.

Do we have the same situation in case of aesthetic pleasure? As usual, similarly, an object is required – artistic work – that is necessary to satisfy the need. However, the object has a quite different role here. On the contrary, in the case of eating the acts themselves are basic and essential. The object itself does not cause the satisfaction of need, but the realization of the acts which are implemented by the impact of an object, the artistic creation, namely, by the aesthetic contemplation. If the need for food was satisfied by enactment of the eating process (biting, chewing, and swallowing) and not by assimilating the food material, then there would be no substantial difference between aesthetic pleasure and eating, and it could not be a separate form of behavior. This is not the case, artistic work is just as important to satisfy the aesthetic need as it makes possible to enable the necessary actions. Therefore, it should not be regarded as common form of consumption behavior and even the form of exterogenic behavior. On the other hand, as we can see from our analysis, it is also undeniable that it relates to the consumption behavior. Accordingly, we are convinced that if artistic creativity is the form of behavior analogical to work among the introgenic forms of behavior, aesthetic pleasure is the behavior similar to consumption.

Forms of behavior:

Exterogenic – consumption, service, care, work, curiosity, business;

Introgenic – aesthetic pleasure, artistic creativity, playing, sport, entertainment.

Thus, the diversity of the human behavior forms consists of two main groups, each of which has specific distinct forms of behavior. All these forms can be sorted as follows:

It would be a mistake to think that these forms of behavior are separated by the ultimate margins. On the contrary, in everyday life they are so closely linked to each other that it is often difficult to attribute any specific behavior to the particular form. As far as the classification of behavior forms is based on a psychological point of view, we think that if we have to decide what basic behavior forms are we dealing with in every given moment, only the subjective basic feeling should be important. It would be interesting to underline how frequent are the cases when behaviors which objectively seem to be the same, appear the essentially different forms of behavior, when we consider the main feeling of the subject. This would be one of the strongest proof in favor of the idea that a really fruitful study of behavior on the basis of behavioral psychology is absolutely hopeless. However, this would take us far if we specially stopped and discussed it. It is enough for now to warn the readers that the forms of behavior that we have separated from each other are not exclusively confined and are often mixed in concrete reality.

Is the human behavior confined only by those forms that we confirmed above, or is there a case when you cannot say which of the above-mentioned form the particular behavior belongs to?

Let us take an example of *learning!* There is absolutely true that it has a very prominent place in the life of living organisms, especially in human life. What is it? Is it a separate form of behavior or is it one of those behaviors that we have mentioned above? Usually, people think that learning is nothing more than one of the kinds of work, namely, mental work. This view is so widespread that the reader may even think that it is very strange to question it. How can we really doubt the fact that learning, especially schooling, is anything but one of the types of *mental* work. This is a commonly adopted view. In spite of

this, small observation is enough in order to make sure that this concept is groundless.

What is the basis for spreading this false view? When we say that learning is a kind of mental work, there is no doubt that we already have a peculiar understanding of learning. No doubt, we think that learning has a purpose to acquire some value, habit or knowledge. However, in order to achieve this goal, we have to undertake some activity that results in the acquisition of this habit and knowledge. As in the case of work, the main thing is work product. The activity itself that gives this product is not independent, but as each method has a totally dependent value. It is the same in case of learning: knowledge or habit is considered as the main result. Learning is the necessary energy consumption in order to achieve the needed result. Learning is only important because we would not get habit and knowledge without it. Therefore, it is predetermined here that there would be no sense in work and learning and they would be unnecessary, if the subsequent habit or knowledge would have been acquired without them. In a word, according to the preliminary statements, learning itself does not have any independent value. Only the habits and knowledge which we get through learning have importance and value.

But let us see if there is sufficient similarity between learning and work products to justify this statement. When speaking about work, we always have in mind some kind of product, creation of which was the only reason for spending the work power, as work itself does not entail any other effects except the product creation. A certain work process is only aimed at creating just a given individual product. Is this statement also true for learning? Let us say we teach a child writing: he/she has already learned to write a few letters. What is the effect of learning in this case? Maybe, writing these two letters? No, of course! Besides the fact that now the child knows how to write these letters, he/she has acquired something else that he/she had never had before, because we taught him/her to write these letters: he/she has acquired the ability of using actively his/her smaller muscles to a certain extent. So he/she learned not only how to write these two letters but also the

ability to learn other letters more easily. Moreover, when he/she learns to write a few words, he/she knows not only how to write them but also gets the ability to write other words too. That is why in order to learn writing we do not need to write all the words that we will have a chance to write in the future. The person, who learnt writing, can write the words which he/she was not taught how to write, and he/she can even write the words which he/she has never heard before.

Everything we said above about the learning of writing can be repeated about learning of any other subjects. The work is very different: it gives only one definite product and nothing more. In other words, learning is not only aimed at acquiring the specific individual habit or knowledge, that we learn at a particular time, but even more – its main purpose is to direct the development of the students' proper forces.

That is why we never say that we are teaching the student writing particular word, but we are teaching him/her writing in general; we are not teaching him/her to make certain table, but the tables in general. While in the case of work it would be nonsense to talk about making a table *in general* or making some other thing *in general*.

In this regard other viewpoints also prove that there is substantial difference between working and learning. It is interesting that the concept of learning is incomparably wide than just the mental work or the concept of work in general. Any kind of behavior may be linked with learning: the person can turn consumption acts into learning. This applies to conditional reflexes, which are united in the complex of the consumption behavior – all forms of work, care and services, as well as mental work and activities. In a word, there is not a single form of exogenous behavior that cannot be turned into a subject of learning. No! We can say even more. We acquire all the forms of behavior at the specific level only by learning. This undoubted fact should be sufficient to question the opinion that working and learning are same phenomena.

What does it mean that learning has a general character? There is no doubt that learning is one of the kinds of activity. In the process of learning the product, the subject matter should not be in the first

place, but the aim of learning should be the development of the forces that are engaged in the process of activity. Therefore, the activity in the learning process not only includes the value of the means, but also the independent value, i. e. the main importance of learning is not the product which gives us the knowledge of specific habits or specific content but development of student forces in a specific direction: in learning the development of concrete habit and knowledge are not basic, but the growth of those forces which take part in the learning process. Under no circumstances, the goal of the working process is the development of forces: work exists only for the product and not for the development of the forces which are taking part in it. It is true that objectively work process is followed by the development of human power, but it is a necessary attribute of a certain kind of activity, and not the essence, which is its specific sign. On the contrary, the essence of work is the completed and finalized forces. It is interested in their use and not in their development. And even the level of development itself is measured by how much forces are prepared for work production! The Polytechnic School is a labor school not because it transforms learning into working, and vice versa, but because it admits it is a mistake to turn school into factory or a factory into school. On the contrary, its main idea is that the development of human work forces requires special care, learning, and this care should be linked to the general development of the human being, or, better, included in its entirety. This means that the polytechnic work should be taught not in a professional but in general education schools and the latter should not be a one-sided education, but a polytechnic work school.

In a word, learning is essentially different from the specific behavior that was called, in the text above, the production work.

As we already know, no other forms of behavior are characterized with such intensity of adolescent development as playing. On the other hand, and for that reason, as we mentioned above, playing is a general form of behavior. But as we have been asserted, both of these signs are characteristic of learning. From this point of view we should reach to the conclusion that learning and playing are the same forms

of behavior, and in fact, in the history of pedagogical thinking, this idea has been repeatedly proposed. *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* and the supporters of so-called *free school* in the final report were based on the idea that learning and playing are the same. Since Rousseau's idea finds some supporters and, on the other hand, according to the widespread opinion there should be nothing in common between playing and learning, it is essential to discuss this issue.

All our discussions concerning the relationship between learning and working were directed to make it clear how working is different from learning and how close it is to the playing. Almost all the basic signs that distinguish the concept of learning from the concept of working are the very signs that are characteristic of playing. Especially important is one of these signs, namely that learning and playing are essentially based on the purpose of development of forces. We think that after all there are already enough facts to claim that the concepts of playing and learning are related. On the contrary, the entire course of discussion so far naturally led the reader to the idea that both these forms of behavior are the same rather than different. That is why we should look at this thought and decide: Is playing really so much like learning to think that they are the same?

If learning is a form of activity, the aim of which should be sought in the development of internal forces, it is obvious that there is no external need to predict the object that is necessary for this activity. Therefore, learning is a form of activity that is not caused by the external need: as in case of playing this role belongs to functional tendency here. This means that the objects needed for the activity in the case of learning and that are given to a subject, are not externally obliged, but are internal, free and inherent to the forces of action. This view once again proves the idea that learning and playing can be the same, at least learning is the introgenic form of behavior as well as playing. However, this is not true. Learning always means something that is taught: the content of the concept itself implies the idea of something external, which comes to the student from the outside that is not built on the basis of the free impulse of his/her forces. We teach something

to the student, i. e. we give the power to the object, and they do not choose or create it freely. At a certain level of adolescence, for example, the function of speech is so developed that the tendency or impulse of their activation is emerged. Activation of speaking functions means speaking! However, speech can be activated in one particular language. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to satisfy a functional tendency of speech if we do not give it the object from the outside, e. g. any certain language material. Learning means activating the speaking functions by providing the object, material from the outside. Let us consider the second example: the child had the mental functions of counting so developed that the tendency of their enactment emerged. A child himself/herself would probably be forced to enact his/her functions in such a way that allow him/her to pass only the steps that human ancestors' arithmetic thinking passed through the process of its natural development. In fact, in our school, the arithmetical thinking of adolescents starts functioning on the basis of the arithmetic material and rules relevant to today's stage of our cultural development. However, these materials and these rules are not created by the adolescents' functions independently, but we give him/her everything from the *outside* and this is called learning to count. The function of the child's arithmetic thinking develops based on the material provided from the outside. Therefore, we assume that, while learning means to reveal the functional tendency of the inner forces of the adolescent, it only reveals based on the material we provide from the outside. In the case of learning, the inner forces do not find, choose, or create an external object necessary for their activation, as it happens in playing, but the object is determined by the choice of adults. Therefore, development does not happen based on the freely chosen material here, as in the case of playing, but on the material that the adults consider appropriate.

There is a question: why is it so? Is it necessary to learn? Could it be possible for the adolescent to find a way himself/herself, to leave its development under the direction only of a functional tendency? It is not difficult to solve this issue if we correctly understand the con-

cept of functional tendency. In reality, a separate function is just an object of our scientific analysis. In particular reality, it is only a part in the whole, i. e. there is an interfunctional relationship among the functions, it exists only in relation with other functions. Functional tendency means the impulse of activating this whole. When we say that the form of human activity is sometimes based on the functional tendency, it can only be understood that the impulse of activating the particular inter-functional complexes can be triggered at the definite stage of development. These complexes are not defined once and forever in the organism. They are elaborated in the development of humanity and every individual person inherits them as the possibility. Hence, at every stage of human development, according to the specificity of this development, every human being has a unique inter-functional complex that his/her ancestors had reached on a long-term basis. Therefore, these complexes are a product of cultural development and obviously, a relevant object, corresponding material is needed in order to activate them. For instance, let us take a simple case: compare the possibility of an arithmetic thinking of the primitive child! Can we say that in two cases we have the same kind of inter-functional capability? No, certainly not. Can we say that the same object, the same material is necessary to activate these capabilities? No, definitely not. If the functions are different, the subject or the material that is a necessary condition of their enforcement should be also different. No one has ever used or was able to use the same complex mathematical material, which is used for mathematical development of today's cultural humans, in order to activate the arithmetic thinking of primitive children. This material, as well as its corresponding functions, is an inter-functional whole, which has only been achieved in result of cultural development. It is a cultural achievement and, therefore, modern-day children can develop through the material acquired in this process of cultural evolution. However, this cultural material, modern mathematics, is so elaborated that the child, of course, cannot independently create it for himself/herself in order to activate his/her mathematical thinking: it must necessarily be given to him/her by the adult who

has mastered this material. As far as the most uncultured, primitive, natural person never existed, because the notion of a person denies this possibility, we shall think, that learning, as the development of the human forces by providing the necessary material, was always an integral part of human upbringing. What the humans have acquired in the process of cultural development is impossible for a single person to acquire in the natural way, without cultural influence.

Thus, it should be admitted absolutely undoubtedly that the activation of human forces in the process of learning is not on the basis of spontaneously found or created matching material, but on the basis of the material supplied by the adult: in the process of learning, the adolescent power does not spontaneously find the object, but it is given to him/her by someone else from the outside. In this regard, learning is much like work and differs greatly from playing. It means that it is more exterogenic form of behavior than introgenic. Nevertheless, it cannot be considered as an exterogenic form of behavior. The main point here is that in case of exterogenic forms of behavior the object is given to the subject so that the actual needs of his/her forces are not taken into consideration. For example, what will be the need for a person at any specific moment in the future and, therefore, what forces must be placed in an active position to meet the need, it is not entirely dependent on which of his/her forces are currently operating. Some intensive urgent need, which may require a great tension of forces, may emerge even in case a man is completely overwhelmed by illness or exhausted because of long-term work. This is not true in case of learning. Because the main intention of learning is to develop the forces of the student, it is impossible for the adult who leads the study process, intentionally to assign him/her the enactment of those forces that are not ready at this stage of development. Otherwise, the full failure of his/her teaching would be easily predictable by the teacher. No, the teacher is always forced to provide the student with those forms of cultural inheritance, which will be appropriate for activation of the forces that are at that time set for the activation. So, what we teach the adolescent depends on the development of his/her forces.

Of course, we are interested not only in him/her but also in forces we aim to develop, in functional possibilities, as well as what kind of person we are aiming to raise. In a word, learning is a two-sided process: (the forces the activation tendency of which arises in a given stage of development, and) the ideal of the caregiver, who thinks the development of these forces is necessary and not those forces.

In this regards, learning can be considered the form of introgenic behavior as well as an exterogenic form, although it is neither one nor the other. It is a more transitional form between two main categories of behavior. It is a transition level, which the human should follow after playing in order to reach the level of human with working capabilities.

This concept of learning clearly shows how *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* or so-called *free school pedagogy* were mistaken, when they equated learning to the level of playing, or, on the other hand, how the scholastic school was mistaken, which defined learning process only to safeguard the caregiver's interests, and did not make any allowance for the level and tendency of the internal potential of the adolescent.

The school is not a playground, but also it is not a factory where human forces are ordered to prepare the products, and therefore only get those people who already have the necessary forces developed. Therefore, it is clear, what principle the school should be built upon as well as its content and methods. When the need in society emerges, and let us say that electric cars are needed to meet these needs, then the society builds adequately equipped factory where it will employ the people who are well prepared to work for the production of these machines. In cases of learning we are dealing with the opposite situation. The main goal here is to develop the forces of adolescent. Therefore, the content and methods of learning at each given point should be the ultimate solution reached after the pedagogical reasoning, having in mind these forces. The fruitful work involves the psycho-technologically grounded organization, the fruitful learning involves the pedagogically substantiated content and the organization.

Thus, learning is a form of behavior that cannot be confused with playing or work, or any other form of behavior; all of other forms of behavior are included either in introgenic or exterogenic groups, but learning has the elements of both of them and thus differs from each of them.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY¹

Dimitri Uznadze

One of the most important tasks of psychology is to support pedagogy and teachers. Nobody denies this fact, neither teachers nor psychologists. Nevertheless, today we cannot conclude that it is finally determined what is meant under the support in this case, and how psychologists can fulfill their obligations towards pedagogy. Frequently the teacher understands the idea of help the following way: when the teacher faces a difficult pedagogical issue, for example, the issue of upbringing conscious discipline, he/she requires direct involvement of psychologist to solve this pedagogical issue for him/her – as if psychology is devoted to teach pedagogy how to solve pedagogical issues.

Unfortunately, often the psychologist also understands the task of helping pedagogy this way, and usually behaves correspondingly when studying any psychological issue, for example, problem of the will. He/She is not satisfied with conveying results of the research, but also attempts to make pedagogical conclusions. This rule is so widespread that we can meet it not only in pedagogical psychology, but frequently we can come across with it in general psychology courses and textbooks. To make this statement clear and undoubtable for all it is sufficient to mention the text book edited by prof. Kornilov, in which almost every single chapter is supplemented by the list of pedagogical conclusions.

1 (Editor's note). This work was first published in 1941, in the Journal "Komunisturi Agzrdisatvis "[Communist upbringing], vol. 5. This version is translated from "Shesavali tanamedrove azrovnebashi" [Introduction to the Modern Thought]. (2007). (Part IV, pp. 186-195). Ilia State University press.

There is no need for greater judgmental skills to understand how misleading and harmful can be the interpretations of support in this way. It is out of the question that pedagogical conclusions, regardless their origination, represent pedagogical statements. Therefore, when a psychologist makes such conclusions, he/she leaves the boundaries of psychology and intrudes the realm of pedagogy trying to deal with pedagogical work. In this case, it is obvious that achieving “restoration of pedagogy in its rights” is under the question.

After all, as the pedagogical statements are put forward by psychology as far as they represent conclusions based on psychological data and these statements cannot be principally considered as pedagogic. The point is that these statements are based only on psychological basis while there are other supportive sciences of pedagogy together with the psychology and, its statements should be affirmed not only by psychological aspects but other aspects too. In essence, it is impossible for psychology to consider these aspects, and therefore its pedagogical conclusions are principally always unilateral. To sum up things, psychologism represents a wrong viewpoint in the pedagogy and redirecting the task of making pedagogical conclusions to psychology means psychologism invades the pedagogy.

Therefore, it becomes clear that pedagogical conclusions are not among the objectives of psychology even if these conclusions are derived from psychological data. Psychology does not provide help with such conclusions, but on the contrary rises difficulties and brings disorientation in pedagogy as far as other important aspects that are essential for pedagogy are neglected as result of such help. Developing pedagogic statements are of course the pedagogical task only and psychology is supposed to help it this way. The point is that many things are needed to create pedagogic statement and especially psychological material: in order to make human upbringing possible, it is necessary to take into account regularity of the development of his/her psyche: rarely we meet the issue in pedagogy, that is successfully solved without careful consideration of relevant psychological material. Therefore, pedagogy cannot competently solve any similar problem

unless psychological material is provided, if it lacks the knowledge of regularities of psychic dimensions, rising of which is the question now. But how does the pedagogy obtain this psychological material? From where should it learn about the laws of mental life? Of course, only from the scientists who are responsible for this research: the psychologists. Pedagogy asks from psychology nothing but studying the psychological peculiarities of the sphere of reality, that represent the subject of its interest: pedagogy anticipates help from psychology only to conduct psychological research of mentoring and certain key moments in the pedagogical process, and thus give pedagogy the opportunity to develop its pedagogical statements by careful examination of important psychological reality. Psychology is not asked to develop pedagogic statements in the form of pedagogical conclusions based on the psychological provisions but whatever is asked about the field must be consistent with the interest of the pedagogy – the science of upbringing.

Bearing the above mentioned statement in mind it becomes clear what the so-called pedagogical psychology is and what kinds of issues it may face. Unfortunately, frequently the pedagogical psychology is understood as something like a peculiar mixture of pedagogy and psychology at the same time. This is clearly seen from the contents of this scientific discipline, as described in the latter's traditional courses. As a rule, firstly comes the illustration of any important processes from the perspective of pedagogy, e. g. studying the psychological nature of calculation, writing, reading and then suggesting the pedagogical statement that results from the psychology of the process. Briefly: here is the psychology of these processes and, as a result, the pedagogy – in the form of pedagogical conclusions. This means that such diffusion science cannot exist: pedagogical psychology cannot become pedagogy only because it examines important processes in pedagogical terms – as if psychology must study only practically non-interesting processes. By all means pedagogical psychology is the psychology and no one can oblige it to develop pedagogic statements. The only reason why pedagogical psychology is called pedagogical

is because it conducts psychological research of important processes and facts in terms of learning and upbringing; it collects the very psychological material which is necessary for pedagogy to successfully solve its issues. Pedagogical psychology is the branch of psychology, which directly serves the pedagogy – theoretical and practical – as far as it gathers psychological material of the specific issues pertinent to problems of upbringing and learning.

However, does modern psychology provide adequate help to pedagogy? Does it provide pedagogy with the knowledge of the processes, of those genuine psychological processes that it is interested in? It should be noted that pedagogy is completely unsatisfied with what psychology provides. The pedagogical psychology has existed for a long time, and it has tried to examine the psychology of many processes important from the perspective of pedagogy. Despite this, the pedagogy is still dissatisfied with psychology: it cannot provide the assistance needed.

What is the reason for that? The response is – traditional psychology is an abstract science; it is not a psychology of a certain human living but rather psychology of particular psychic functions of personality. The pedagogy is dealing with the upbringing of an individual personality and therefore requires the knowledge of the regularities of the actions of this particular human being. Unfortunately, psychology does not provide it because it produces researches of attention, memory, imagination and other functions, rather than a specific active person. Therefore, the pedagogy is dissatisfied with psychology: it cannot provide pedagogy with proper assistance.

This unproductivity feature of traditional psychology has also been observed in other sciences that require psychological assistance, and this fact was specially emphasized at the end of the 19th century. Then it was asked to introduce new, more concrete and more productive psychology. It is enough to recall the critique of Dilthey against the experimental psychology and the movement related with his name, especially in Germany, which was trying to justify the new psychology – cultural scientific psychology (*geistes-wissenschaftliche Psychologie*).

Nowadays psychology has fully aware of short comings of the established functionalism of the traditional psychology and it seeks to transform into the psychology of specific, living human being. There is a complete agreement in this regard not only among psychologists but between pedagogy and psychology too. Everyone suggests that abstract lifeless science must be substituted by active human psychology and in result the pedagogy will receive sufficient assistance from psychology.

Thus, the task is obvious and undoubted: the psychology of a particular individual and active person should be created. However how can we implement this?

It is especially noted today, that the main drawback of traditional psychology –its insularity is the outcome of examining the psychic without consideration of specific behavior, the daily practice (see, for example, Rubinstein’s “Fundamentals of General Psychology”). Therefore, it is necessary to alter this condition, in order to deal with the specific psychology of the living person the psychic needs to be examined in the context of active person’s behavior. It should be mentioned that this viewpoint is only partially true: in order to build specific psychology, it is not sufficient to study the psychics in the perspective of the practice alone. Do not we know sufficient facts when traditional psychology has been examining different forms of human practice (study, play, or work) and this circumstances did not shape it into a totally specific psychology?! Not only the fact that traditional psychology examines human psychics without our activity, our practice, but it should be also stressed, that psychology studies human psychic without a living person, an active subject, and this is the main reason for its insularity and its lifelessness. Therefore, when it comes to the psychological study of types of human practice, e. g. learning or working, its results are still insular, they are still not specific, still remain lifeless, because the practice without subject is not the real practice that actually exists; it is an insular, lifeless “practice”.

How does this drawback of traditional psychology arise? What is the main source of this? I undoubtedly acknowledge that the reason

is traditionally accepted, pre-certified, unverified concept of psychic dimensions that continues to dominate not only in psychology but in every scientific field dealing with psychic, and therefore in pedagogy as well. The origin of this thought comes from the pre-scientific period of human thinking and receives its own justification from that period, when the soul was known as an independent metaphysical reality, and as such, it could only have direct communication with the reality outside of it. It was thought that the soul itself was an independent reality that could join the body, separate it, act on it and get influenced by it. In short: the soul is in direct interaction with the external reality; it is directly affected by its impact and is acting directly on it.

These days, at the modern level of development of our science, no one ever thinks seriously about existence of an independent, metaphysical essence, the soul. Today, we consider only empirically emphasized feelings or spiritual facts. Still, it is surprising, that we do not call into question correctness of the old faith – there is no doubt in the opinion that an immediate relationship exists between the soul and the external reality, at least all the traditional psychology is understood the way, that all the laws that it confirms still emphasize the principle of the pure immediacy: everything that happens in the psychic, in the mentality, is the outcome of the immediate impact from external stimuli. In short: the stimulus, no matter whether it is a physical act or mental one, directly affects the psychic and entails the immediate effect on it.² For example, one idea is directly related to the other and this connection is of a logical nature: so we get the famous association laws; as a rule, the emotional content of our consciousness is related to intellectual content: sweetness causes pleasure, bitterness – unpleasant sensations, etc. Intense irritation directly affects human attention; in a word, every change that is ongoing in the psychic, in the belief of traditional psychology, is the immediate effect of any stimulus – the inner or the outside, and therefore no mid-member is required for its interpretation: the psychic directly experiences the influence of real-

2 See my “General Psychology” p. p. 34-40 and the main statements of the mood theory – the University Works, Vol. 19.

ity and directly interacts with it, as an independent reality interacts with the other independent reality. That is why traditional empirical psychology avoids the subject, the person, whose agent is psychic and becomes a psychology of mental facts or psychic functions. It does not need the subject at all, because it believes that mental phenomena are in direct contact with the reality. Therefore, it is quite natural that the concept of an active subject, personality has no place in a traditional empirical psychology and it is considered to be a problem of separate scientific discipline, characterology. Empirical psychology is an unsubjected psychology, and it becomes a psychology of the functions that have been pulled out from the whole living subject.

This also explains why traditional psychology is studying human psychics without understanding the reasonable behavior or action of the practice, psychics that is not connected with practice: practice is a process of activity of living subject, a particular person, and it is natural that the unsubjected psychology does not pay attention to it.

Pedagogy must solve the problems of learning and upbringing, and these issues are absolutely certain, connected with specific human practices. It is natural that the psychology of unsubjected functions based on the principle of immediacy could not be adequately applied to it. The point is that the issue of psychic causality is essential for pedagogy, as for the science of upbringing. The fundamental error of the traditional psychology, as we know, is in the solution of this problem, namely, in the recognition of the principle of immediacy, which was regarded as the principle of psychological causality. This principle was regarded an unchallenged statement in theoretical pedagogy as well. Usually, this means: in order to raise somebody, you must act on his/her psychic— his/her thinking, his/her will and his/her emotions. That is why knowledge of the peculiarities of the child's psychic is necessary for the pedagogy.

This statement concludes: if it is required to act on the child's psychic then it is necessary to keep in mind the peculiarities of the psychic. Without the knowledge of these peculiarities, the effort will not be rewarding. The idea is clear: the upbringing process is a di-

rect influence on the psychic. Therefore, in the process of upbringing, the subject is either completely ignored, or is identified with psychic. However, we know that the subject of upbringing process is neither the psychic functions nor the psychic in general, but the specific human being as a living active person. No doubt, the principle of immediacy played negative role in the pedagogical practice. As far as psychology was built on the principle of immediacy, it is obvious that it would be more strengthening this principle in the pedagogy than weakening or suppressing.

Thus, traditional psychology, which is built on the principle of immediacy and therefore is the abstract, unsubjected psychology, is two fold, even useless for pedagogy: it cannot provide the fresh psychological material about the areas of reality that interests pedagogy, and in addition, it strengthens its harmful tendencies due to the principle of immediacy.

Consequently, we get a totally undisputed conclusion: The principle of immediacy must be rejected by psychology. The problem of psychic causality must be solved so that psychology becomes the science of a living, concrete, active human. This means that the notion of the subject must take its suitable position in psychology: the whole psychology – along with the other not least important concepts – must be based on this notion. Psychology of the unsubjected and abstract functions must give way to the psychology of the subject, of the acting personality.

Certainly, this can only be achievable if psychology refers to its starting point through the living, concrete and integral reality, instead of the abstract and partial reality which it receives as result of the analysis. If psychology studies its subject not by taking into consideration the psychic and physical parts individually, but begins with the active subjects, in their entirety, and in particular tries to access the peculiarities of the whole.

But how can be this goal achieved? Where should the scientific research find that integrity in order to carry out its specific study?

Today psychology is fully capable of giving response to these questions. There is a substantial factual material, at its disposal that proves the potential of conducting and productivity of specific scientific research of this integrity. Whatever we mean here is the Psychology of Set, and the concept of set has enabled the whole, active subject to become a subject of concrete scientific research and thus convinced, that it is absolutely unnecessary for the psychology to be built on the principle of immediacy and essentially be an abstract science. The Psychology of Set has shown that genuine scientific psychology can be the psychology of the live active subject.³ It has proved that the concept of set plays a decisive role in this case, since it entails not only a partial element–psychic or physiologic, but the particular subject itself as a whole, and thus creates the possibility to study the laws of integrity.

It is noteworthy that there are given both cardinal notions in the concept of set which are known for being essentials of building specific psychology and, therefore, for satisfying the needs of the pedagogy – the moment of the individual and the moment of practice. Actually, the set has the holistic nature, it is characteristic of the active subject as a whole. At the same time it also expresses the readiness of this active subject to act. Therefore, in the concept of set, both moments are meant to be simultaneous – an action and an active person. It is evident that in the Psychology of Set the concept of the personality and the concept of acting are interrelated, and it is evident that both these concepts – the personality and the acting – have the fundamental role in the real scientific psychology.

Thus, we see that psychology based on the concept of set can provide special assistance to all the sciences, and first of all, to the pedagogy which is dealing with the activity of – individual.

But psychology of set is able to provide genuine assistance to the pedagogy not only because it represents the psychology of particular individual and active personality. No! There are certain grounds to be-

3 See D. Uznadze, "General Psychology". See also the basic statements of the set theory. The University Works, Vol. 19.

lieve that in addition to that, psychology of set is of particular importance to pedagogy. The point is that the concept of set itself has a special pedagogic value, and so special that it will probably become one of the fundamental concepts of the pedagogy in future. Upbringing, learning, development – nothing is so meaningful for their understanding as the concept of set, because it is inevitable that upbringing process has particularly intimate relation with the set.

We can analyse and observe the undisputed facts of genuine upbringing in order to understand the role of set in upbringing process. It is not surprising, that there have always been talented educators and professional teachers who have had significant success in their practical pedagogical work. Such cases provide perfect material for real pedagogical research. Is not it true that we are dealing with correct pedagogical impact here? What exactly is the correctness of these impacts, namely, what is the reason of this success in their work? The teacher usually does not even have a well thought out and so when we ask him/her about it, he/she cannot give the correct answer. The teacher can easily report the fact, but description of the basis and the nature of this fact is the matter of theory and not everyone is able to interpret the theory correctly, even though he/she achieves good practical results. Involvement of pedagogical theory is the prerequisite of finding the grounds for correct pedagogical impacts. This is the work of pedagogy.⁴ The source of truth is the practice, and science is the theory, the generalization of it.

Nevertheless, if we analyze the facts of successful pedagogical practice, we will see that the teachers do not take any measures without considering, in the first place, the personality of the adolescent. The pedagogic tact does not allow the teacher to ignore adolescent's personality as a whole, and directly influence his/her psychic. There are proofs that make us think that creating an appropriate set in this case plays a decisive role. Examples of successful pedagogical practices clearly indicate that the principle of immediacy is not the basis

4 This statement has been grounded in my "Introduction to the Experimental Pedagogy" 30 years ago.

for them: a teacher does not act directly on psychic – mindset or emotion, but primarily on the personality of the adolescent and therefore ensures his/her psychic development in the first place.

Psychology of the active personality will provide real assistance to the pedagogy – it is indisputable fact. Still such a complete psychology is still a matter of future. Therefore, one might think that pedagogy should wait for the development of this new psychology and while this happens, they should refrain themselves and do not apply for needed assistance to psychological science.

But such a conclusion would have been undoubtedly mistaken. The thing is that psychology is science, and traditional, classical psychology is one of the stages of development of this science. This means that it cannot be regarded as a bunch of mistakes. Of course, psychology was going forward in the course of its development, and nowadays it has accumulated so many significant observations that its principal renovation became necessary for further development. Of course, the issue of renovation would not have arisen, unless psychology had expanded and developed and its accumulation could have been possible in the old principle and methodological framework.

In short, classical psychology has a number of precious observations, many important provisions, it contains a number of “grains of truth” and, of course, refusal from it would be a big mistake. The pedagogy can still do much in old psychology that would be useful for it.

But such a conclusion would have been inevitably mistaken. The thing is that one must have enough psychological knowledge to be able to correctly select something that is really useful for him/her from the rich material of psychology. Sadly, today the pedagogy and the teachers are not very promising in this regard: Because of the low level of psychological preparation, they do not even know what psychology representing the modern stage of development, and what will be genuinely useful for them to apply. In short: teachers do not have enough knowledge of psychology and, therefore, cannot make a use of it. Psychology is a worthless science for them, not because it is generally worthless but because they do not use it appropriately. Cer-

tainly, the traditional, abstract, lifeless psychology is unable to satisfy the needs of the pedagogy. Since the teachers' level of psychological preparation remains the same this situation will not change even if the new psychology comes in place of the old psychology.

Thus, relationship of the psychology and pedagogy is the interrelationship between two independent sciences: psychology only produces psychological research and pedagogy – pedagogical research. The principle of the assistance that psychology can provide the teachers is that, firstly, it (psychology) gives the right psychological information to the teacher who has to deal with psychic and such information is always necessary for him/her and secondly, it prepares psychological material of the issues, which are the immediate interest of the pedagogy. However, on the other hand, pedagogy also helps psychology: successful practice of pedagogic influence and its correct theory is the basis for the study of psychological development of humans, and thus it is involved in solving of one of the main problems of psychology – the problem of psychic development. Psychology and pedagogy are two independent sciences, but they are not isolated from each other. On the contrary, they help and complement each other.

PHILOSOPHY OF WAR¹

Dimitri Uznadze

I remember a picture I saw a few years ago. It was a simple picture but made a strong impression on me. Imagine a beautiful young girl gliding gracefully on the surface of a frozen lake. She is constantly accompanied by her shadow, which the artist imagines as a deadly skeleton with its inanimate, fleshless hands stretched out. It is trying to hug the girl's perfect body and hold her close to its cold heart. It wants to put an end to her life, but the girl seems to have guessed the intent of her invisible companion. She skates on the lake's surface. We see, that she is nearing the place that is not frozen enough... A minute's skate will lead her to the edge. The shadow of death reaches to the girl, but the girl suddenly moves aside as if she wants to get out of the hands of death. She changes direction and continues her way. Time goes by... But suddenly the girl loses balance and the deadly skeleton stretches its hands toward her even more avidly to embrace her beautiful body. The girl, however, regains balance and escapes death. Every step of the girl, every movement of her body is driven by a single desire to escape the hands of the inanimate skeleton. Thus, her every move is dictated by the fear of death. The picture impressed me. It touched me deeply because at the sight of the scene my consciousness drew a picture of human fate – and, indeed, such is the entire life of a man!

1 (Editor's note). This work was first published in 1914, in the Journal "Sakhalkho Purtseli" [Public Papers], in issues: №148, 149, 150, 153 and 155. This version is translated from "Shesavali tanamedrove azrovnebashi" [Introduction to the Modern Thought]. (2015). (Part III, pp. 213-236). Ilia State University Press.

Every step of ours is dictated by our sense of fear. From the first moments of our birth, we try not to fall victims under the grim scythe of death! Our public life, the conditions of our private life, all forms of our existence are created and caused by the fear of death. It is a governing principle of our existence. It is the central regulatory element of human life.

Thus, the fear of death is a permanent and necessary fact of the entire human life.

We all are imbued with this feeling; we are guided by it as we build and destroy our lives. Indeed, there are people who are ungrateful and miserable. They interpret life as a purposeless and needless fight with the omnipotent power of death, which does not really make sense because death invariably awaits at the end. Therefore, they regard death as a form of salvation, as superior goodness. Naturally, they are not likely to feel fear in the face of death – they stare at the blind expression of the dark deeps of death's eyes with delightful reverence, as if impatiently yearning for the chance to contemplate the secret of its clandestine advancement.

These apologists of death are called pessimists. The fear of death must be alien to them, and therefore, their life is to be seen as an exception if compared with other peoples' lives. However, the reality is quite different. These apologists of death are on good terms with death only in words, but when the time comes to prove this friendship, they are overcome with fear of their friend like all ordinary mortals. Think of Schopenhauer! Can you think of a more brilliant disciple of pessimism? It is difficult to find another person trying to escape from death harder than Schopenhauer.

Thus, it is obvious that death inspires equal terror in everyone: it puts out the candle of hope with the same gust of fright in every individual. And, if this holds true, death is to be seen as evil for all of us in the same measure – evil, which is as absolute as the terror it inspires.

Metaphysical Death Is Not Evil

But is it so? Is death evil or is it goodness which increases and matures along with the growth and expansion of each life? There are some thinkers who see more of goodness than evil in death. And, as far as this question is found legitimate, the recognition of death as utmost evil may not seem immune from doubts.

Let us consider what the universal fear of death suggests. It suggests that death is evil. Otherwise, the absolute fear we feel when we face death would be incomprehensible. But how is it conceived in our being? How does it develop and mature? There are a lot of external factors that affect human life. It is like a tender plant that has to adapt to the environment where it sprouts and grows, if it wants to survive. Therefore, adaptation makes the meaning of the entire human life and shapes the goals of all human activities. It sets direction for the streams of one's practical life. During the process of adaptation, thousands of ideas are born that bring people closer to their practical goals and let them understand what the best conditions for their existence are. Practical activities mold and sharpen human mind. In order to best accommodate oneself to the outer world, it is not necessary to grasp the essence of these conditions. It only suffices to understand their interaction and interdependence and to be aware of their external qualities and effects – the damage and benefits they may bring – in order to know how to use them for the benefit of one's life. For example, does one need to grasp the essence of delicious fruits if one knows which tree bears them and when? In fact, it is nothing else but the fruit one has a practical interest in. Does one need to know the essence of the earthquake if one is aware of the harmful effects that may ensue? People thus develop awareness of the interaction of events, while essential knowledge of these events remains beyond the scope of their interests. That is why they rather adapt to gliding on the surface of events than to understanding their essence. Naturally, in such circumstances, a person will only know the superficial value of events. Therefore, it would be unfair to require from our mind, sharpened amid the circumstances of practical life, the true, essential and absolute knowl-

edge. How can it generate absolute knowledge if it has only developed and sharpened in the quest of relative knowledge? So, if you look for absolute, essential knowledge, do not refer to your mind: it will not be able to provide a precise answer.

The same can be said about feelings generated in our consciousness, which are fostered by our practical life. When you want to appreciate the true nature of an event, do not expect these feelings to satisfy your wish. They will be wrong in this case. Their only task is to evaluate practically important moments. Anything above practice is unknown and incomprehensible to such feelings. Let us consider the fact of death: you set a task to evaluate its essential meaning. Naturally, it will only appeal negatively to feelings cultivated on the soil of ordinary life, as death is the rejection, the end of our practical life. Hence, our ordinary feelings will assess it as the greatest evil. However, our aim is not to evaluate the practical meaning of death; we are interested in its essential, absolute value! To this extent, your task cannot be addressed through assessment by ordinary feelings. Consequently, when death is portrayed as the greatest evil, it is not an absolute but a relative assessment.

Does this mean that the true, absolute knowledge is commonly inaccessible because human consciousness is invariably shaped and sharpened in the circumstances of practical life? Are we already deprived of the vigour to leave the surface of events at least once and get into their essence? Is absolute cognition truly inaccessible to humans?

When we aspire for absolute knowledge, we are not interested in the surface but in the essence, i. e. the metaphysical reality of events. Like any other phenomenon, a human being and human consciousness does not belong solely to the practical, ordinary reality, but is also “natural-born” to the metaphysical world. Thus, metaphysical reality is not at all alien to our consciousness. Although adapted to practical existence, humans nevertheless have roots in metaphysical deeps. Therefore, the facts of metaphysical reality must not be inaccessible to us as we belong to it.

It is obvious that the doors of the absolute truth are not fully closed to our consciousness. However, as a result of the “cool-headed” work of human mind in the realm of practical life, the surface of the deeps of human soul has been covered with frost. Human consciousness has adapted to working on the surface, while the deeps have become numb due to permanent inactivity. This is why our mind only generates relative output, while our feelings are not responsive to absolute values. However, the deeps of our spiritual life are not completely frozen. Our soul needs a strong impulse, an irresistible gale to produce smashing waves and break through the frosty surface. Then our consciousness will throw off the chains it got into by the exercise of our practical life, and it will be possible to gain some knowledge of the absolute metaphysical reality. However, such a powerful storm rarely occurs in our soul; the fetters of practical thought are hard to break and the direct forces of our spiritual life are rarely released. At this moment we experience the sensation of birth, escape the intentions of practical life and once freed, allocate space for independent feelings in the domain of our soul.

Such powerful movements of soul are not common, but each of us has experienced them.

For example, let us consider the fact of suicide. I remember a moment in my life when I was entirely overwhelmed by one emotion. It was the moment when I heard about my best friend's suicide. No matter how strongly I opposed the idea of suicide, I had to surrender to the strong and noble feeling that overwhelmed my entire mind. It was a deep empathy for the fact of suicide, and as such, aimed to exonerate it, although I regarded all kinds of death as evil and the triggering of premature death as an evil service. However, the measure of practical life proved inapplicable in this case: the disposition toward suicide I exposed was an unmediated response of my nature, a spontaneous, natural evaluation of the fact of life. Therefore, I trusted it more than the arguments of mind disposed to reasoning. However, let us leave suicide alone. A more illustrative and convenient for us is the fact of war. Our ordinary reasoning conceptualizes death as the utmost evil

and disaster. It will never justify death. Therefore, conscience, nurtured by practical life, finds a murderer deserving of the highest measure of punishment as the cause of the greatest of evils. But a war starts... and our judgments and feelings change profoundly. The war stirs a powerful whirlpool in the deeps of our soul. The orderly set of values, crystalized under normal conditions of life, is destroyed all at once. Conscience, a force that consolidates and accomplishes the system of values, shakes to its foundations: the enemy's death appeals to us as a pleasant and encouraging news. Hundreds of thousands of budding lives are destroyed in one day; roses of hopes planted in their hearts wither away. This would have filled our souls with bitterness at other times, but now we are delighted. If a person has distinguished himself by annihilating the entire camp of the enemy, we admire his "chivalry", and the more destructive his actions are, the more we appreciate him. On other occasions, a murderer of a single person would be punished implacably, because we regarded death as the greatest evil. But now the killer of thousands is awarded with a surprising generosity. If we would publicly denounce a murderer of one person as an evil criminal, a man who has the blood of thousands on his hands now appears to be a hero and benefactor.

Obviously, war entirely liberates our spiritual life from the pre-eminence of the categories of mind, thus paving way for our immediate, spontaneous assessments.

Obviously, there are some powerful moments in our life whose intensity breaks up the web of our mind covering the surface of the deeps of our spiritual life and sets free our immediate, spontaneous sensations and assessments. At this point, the following question crops up: do we have to follow the beaten paths of our mind and ignore our natural feelings at such moments as well? As we have already seen, mind is not capable of evaluating and understanding facts of life, and therefore, in this case, we may find spontaneous sensations a more reliable path to follow. A scrutiny into this matter is the only opportunity to find the right approach to the question of war and understand the strange fact that murders committed on the battlefield

are rather perceived as chivalry than a crime. So, how does our natural belief respond to the complicated situation resulting from warfare? It describes death as heroism. It claims that a personal life is only a way through which the profound purpose underlying human existence is accomplished.

From this perspective, death and life seem to acquire the same value for the accomplishment of this purpose: it is fulfilled either through death or through life.

Therefore, we should not seek the meaning of our existence within the limits of our (personal) life but beyond (and above) it.

Vladimir Solovyov's War Philosophy

A famous Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solovyov believes, like us, that the purpose of human life is not to be sought in subjective dispositions or be equated with happiness but is definitely objective. But how does Solovyov understand the objective purpose of our life? In his philosophy, the empirical world is characterized by the prevalence of unbridled egoism: permanent dissipation, envy and hostility, the rule of endless war of all against all. Metaphysical reality has a totally different character. Solovyov argues that it only harbours infinite accord and love. All what exhibit irreconcilable animosity in the physical world unite in deep harmony in the boundless sea of love, which is the true principle of metaphysical reality. Thus, the two worlds appear to be the opposite poles. However, a careful observer will notice the falsity of this idea. The empirical world indeed is a realm of infinite egoism, but if egoism were its only content, it would collapse immediately and its existence would be impossible. The principle of the metaphysical world – love – should exist in the empirical world as well. And this is indeed so. The so-called laws of nature, such as Newton's law of gravitation or the chemical equilibrium law, are nothing more than the expression of universal love inherent in the whole metaphysical existence. However, the laws of nature are unable to fully convey universal love, while the purpose of life, its meaning and objective, consists in the full accomplishment of love in this world. If this holds

true, human life should not be seen as an exception. All our existence should be direct evidence of development attuned to love, unity and solidarity.²

War is an important event in human life. Therefore, in Solovyov's opinion, it should serve the accomplishment of the meaning of life. He tries to find evidence in history and refers to a number of wars that were aimed at unification. But if we consider critically the Russian philosopher's ideas about war, we will see that they are not very close to the truth. It is not a big challenge to prove that wars in general do not contribute to the consolidation of humankind. Let us recall the wars that resulted in the disintegration of the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire was a universal state, but wars accompanying great migrations did not spare the giant and it was replaced by up to ten influential monarchies only in Europe. The so-called Thirty Years' War resulted in German particularism instead of its unification. The same can be said about the wars that divided the Ottoman Empire into several national states. Many other examples could be cited to show that the historical arguments supporting Solovyov's construct of life tend to be so weak that they can hardly account for quite a number of historical facts.

Solovyov's philosophy is inappropriate not only from the historical but from other perspectives as well. If warfare is supposed to serve the purpose of the world's existence, consolidation and love, then any war – being an instrument of the accomplishment of the universal purpose – should invoke the same spiritual disposition in all warriors and invariably be the source of heroism and self-sacrifice. If all wars truly reflected the meaning of life, each soldier, being a servant of this noble cause, would feel the eminence of his actions at least in the subconscious nooks of his perception and this feeling would be manifested through his heroism and self-sacrifice.

However, everyone knows that not all wars cause the same spiritual exaltation. Some inspire the entire nation with passion, heroism

2 See D. Uznadze, *W Solowiow, scine Metaphysic und Erkenntnistheorie*, S. 162 ff.

and self-sacrifice, while others stir almost no empathy even among the citizens of nation responsible for the war.

Solovyov's theory of the meaning of life as the objective content of human existence, which is to be reflected in every important act of life, is unable to account for these conflicting attitudes to war. Therefore, his construct of life is to be rejected as false. Let us now try to develop our own insights into the process of life, in order to find something that has been left unnoticed by Solovyov.

The Meaning of Life

When we want to grasp the true nature of a fact, we should not resort to human mind. It is unable to penetrate into the essence of events. It only identifies superficial qualities. Completely different is the unmediated assessment of the absolute essential nature of events that outbreaks spontaneously from the depths of our heart. Only this assessment is trustworthy and reliable. Such indeed is the assessment of death which the gusts of the horrors of war cause to resound as a groan out of the depths of our heart and carry to the surface of perception. Under this assessment, the death of a man in a war no longer causes fear. Thus, it appears that our life is not the purpose of our existence but a means to serve external objective purposes and is to be devoted to their accomplishment.

The objective character of our existence is made apparent by the historical past of humankind. Otherwise, the names of Themistocles and Phidias, Aristotle and Plato, Alexander and Napoleon, people who had every opportunity to better provide for their personal happiness, would not have been immortalized. Instead the pantheon of heroes would feature Alcibiades and Crassus, Catiline and Lucullus. Muhammad, Buddha, Confucius, and Christ would have given place to Epicurus and Roman aristocrats, who always sought pleasure in life. However, humankind has never showed particular respect for them; their names will never be worshipped. People care more about those who did not pursue personal happiness but contributed to the

fulfillment of the objective meaning, and take interest in their lives to the extent they were engaged in this process.

The entire historical past of mankind resembles the following picture: imagine an enormous foundation to support a huge structure. Thousands of people have gathered around the base of the future building. Some of them carry heavy stones on their back, while others bring lime and sand. There are also people who have shovels and hammers and move around. In a garden a little bit away from this place, women and men dressed in colorful clothes dance and sing carelessly. They look joyful and satisfied, and show surprise and contempt for the crazy people who have laid some ridiculous foundation and are ardently building some structure. If you ask the builders why they behave so, they may even not have the answer. Thus, people pursuing joy find them crazy, as they are wasting senselessly their short lives on building some edifice.

Our historical past is the same kind of labour. We too have to build an edifice which our ancestors have started and passed to us. So, we have a purpose from birth which we must accomplish unsparingly. Our duty is defined from the very beginning. Therefore, it is no surprise that we instinctively give praise and feel respect for those individuals who have channeled all their efforts into building such an edifice, while those who treat construction as a ridiculous and futile process are deleted from our memory forever. What is this edifice which the best part of humankind is building so painstakingly? We call it cultural creativity. The concept of cultural creativity is often defined in different ways. However, at least, there is no doubt that the concept remains problematic and awaits solution. Historically, two opposite opinions have been known regarding the fact of culture. Rousseau and Tolstoy, who hold a negative view of culture, appear to be its opponents. They believe culture is the regression of humankind rather than advancement and call back to the primitive levels of cultural life. These thinkers are convinced that cultural life does not bring about the improvement of humankind and thus do not associate culture with development. Other opponents are mostly confident in the impor-

tance of cultural life, but they do not believe in the possibility of its development. According to this view, cultural life is not progressing; it is not enriched and broadened as time passes. Rich Hellenic culture was much earlier than medieval. However, does the cultural life of the Middle Ages, enveloped in darkness, compare to the depth and height of Hellenic culture? In short, the opponents believe that culture does not pursue the path of permanent development. Indeed, if we look into the past of cultural life, we may discover that its advancement is not significant. There are frequent occasions in our past which a disregardful observer will qualify as clear evidence of regression and decline. Let us recall the destruction of Hellenic and Roman culture and the development of simple forms of barbarian Germanic peoples' social life on their ruins – a case frequently cited by all opponents of culture. However, it suffices to follow more closely the trajectory of cultural life that the major error underlying the idea of its regressiveness or implausibility will come to the fore. Indeed, it is clear that they mean a universal, integrated culture that follows a linear development. However, integral culture does not exist, and neither does a single, integrated humanity which would necessarily imply the concept of one universal culture. On the contrary, there are as many cultural varieties as there are nations, because, the agent of cultural creativity can only be a nation. And if so, the evidence of decline relative to the Hellenic and Roman culture does not suggest the implausibility of the development of cultural life in general. It only indicates the emergence of a culturally inferior nation on the historical horizon. Hellenic culture was not at all diminished: the art of Phidias and Praxiteles retained the same splendour and the philosophical ideas of Plato and Aristotle the same insight and depth they had had before these new nations emerged, while the appearance of the Germanic tribes on the cultural scene marked the start of their cultural development. Therefore, the medieval history proves the plausibility of cultural life rather than its implausibility.

Thus, when we speak about the development of culture, we should bear in mind the cultural life of one particular nation and may only

question the concept if we find clear evidence of regression and decline in particular cultures. Ancient Greece reached the highest level of development in philosophy and art, while Byzantine philosophy and Byzantine art, although the successor of the Hellenic cultural genius, was less refined and sophisticated. This case may seem to point to an obvious decline of the Greek cultural genius.

However, if we take a closer look at Byzantine art and philosophy, we will see that it substantially differs from Hellenic. The themes and problems discussed in Hellenic art and philosophy belong to a totally different sphere than those prevalent in Byzantine art and philosophy. The former aimed to deal with secular issues, while the latter focused on religious and Christian themes and problems. Evidently, they pursued diverging cultural interests. Therefore, it would be highly erroneous to qualify Byzantine philosophy and art as the continuation of Hellenic philosophy and art. Indeed, Byzantine religious philosophy and religious art has its roots in ancient Greece, and if we compare it with Hellenic art and philosophy, we will see that Byzantium took a giant leap on its path to development, but neglected secular themes and problem, in which sphere its cultural life may obviously seem to decline.

Thus, we must remember that cultural development may have two directions: one is the deepening and perfection of the same issues and the other is the introduction of new issues and expansion to new areas of culture. Both of them have equal cultural value and therefore, are equally important for development. The only difference lies in the former being intensive and the latter extensive. However, naturally, we do not claim that national culture never comes to a halt or suffers regression. Modern Greece or Greece under the Ottoman rule shows no traits of cultural advancement relative to ancient Greece or even Byzantium. However, this is not caused by the culture itself but by external factors: the Greek national spirit lost its creative force and enervated under the Ottoman domination. It even perished away for a while. Hence, it is no surprise that the cultural life of the Greeks came to a halt and even declined under the Ottoman yoke. The Greek

national soul no longer existed. Thus, it is evident that development will anyway find its way amid the perils of human life. It may halt for a long while, take different turns or even reverse, but it will never give up completely, will do its work and, after all, will not lose its factual essence. But, what makes development possible?

When we speak about development, we necessarily mean growth, creation of new forms and momentums. This kind of development is only possible in the absence of obstacles.

Let us consider physical, inorganic nature. Does it have any potential for development? Modern scientists believe that the cornerstone of the entire inorganic nature is the principle of matter and energy conservation. According to this principle, nothing is destroyed or created. Consequently, it a priori excludes any possibility of growth or the creation and development of new matter or energy. The material, inorganic world is characterized by deep passivity, while creativity requires active force. Thus, in the material world, development is not possible from this perspective either.

The logic of development implies the possibility of endlessness, especially when it is not confined to one particular event but pertains to the whole course of life. Endlessness is impossible when the volume of matter and energy is determined once and for all, which too speaks against the possibility of development in the inorganic world. There is yet another aspect that is inherent in the concept of development. It is the assessment of growth and approximation to the ideal at each step of development. Such assessment is impossible in the inorganic world, which is a priori passive and dead in its totality.

However, these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that development is generally impossible. In fact, there certainly exists an active principle that has all the qualities necessary for development. We call this active momentum spirituality. Sameness and immutability is alien to soul. On the contrary, each new instance of a spiritual state is marked by the acquisition of a new content which adds to the old one. And this amazing quality of soul is best of all manifested in the faculty of memory. Soul becomes active on its own, automatically.

It is an active momentum of universal existence, by which it essentially differs from the inactivity of the passive world which is unable to cause an action on its own. Therefore, only this active momentum can be the principle of creativity. However, soul, being marked by limitless activity, at the same time is characterized by endless aspiration. Consequently, it is the absolute momentum in the universe, but with absolute aspiration, potency. This further proves that development which, as mentioned above, implies infinity, can only be pertinent to soul.

However, if the soul is infinite, with infinite aspiration, why is it not the embodied absolute? What does it want, why does it aspire infinitely and for what does it aspire?

According to ancient philosophers (Plato, Aristotle), soul is confined by matter. Therefore, it is not perfect. It only aspires for perfection, which can only be attained when soul overcomes and eliminates matter. Then the aspiration of soul will end and so will the process of development. This is what ancient philosopher's thought.

Modern science claims that matter cannot be eliminated. We should draw on scientific evidence and admit that matter is imperishable. Hence, soul, being the active momentum of the universe, should always struggle against matter or the passive momentum, and it is this permanent struggle that make endless development possible. However, if this struggle is supposed to be permanent and is never bound to end through the complete elimination of the passive momentum, the struggle must obviously aim at gradual reconciliation – the reconciliation of the active momentum of the world with the passive. The latter should gradually become permeable to the active momentum, develop affinity with it, and so to say, become animated. An example of animated matter is a human body: soul imbues each and every cell, rendering them animated and active. The aspiration of the world's active momentum has the same character; it must penetrate the whole material, passive world and turn the whole world into a living organism resembling a human body. This makes the sense of the entire cultural creativity. This is the meaning of cultural development.

Indeed, what else is culture but the permeation and animation of passive momentums? Let us consider science! Being unknown and incognizable to our mind, it appears to be a passive, static and useless area. However, as soon as we cognize it, it is no longer strange and inactive for us, and we employ it to serve our goals.

Consider art! An artist imparts spirit to black or colored marble, the dead material of external nature. What else is the statue of Venus de Milo, or any other statue, but an inspirited creature! Its body is a matter (marble), while its spirit is the artist's idea embodied in the dead material. So, the material is no longer a passive and dead momentum; it is inspirited with the idea of artwork, which is the only thing that keeps it animate.

Consider any area of our cultural life: you will witness the struggle of the active spirit with passive momentums and the reconciliation of passive and active. Everywhere you will see an effort to animate the whole world, an attempt of spirit to invade the veins of passive matter and set it throbbing.

This is the idea of cultural creativity and the purpose of human life. At first glance, this understanding of our existence and purpose of action seems to resemble an old concept of the superiority of soul over body. However, the Christian disparagement and mortification of the flesh as manifested in the early asceticism aimed at the negation of the entire worldly life. From the perspective of Christian asceticism, the worldly life is the realm of Satan and therefore, it is senseless, as well as dangerous, to pursue it. Hence, Christian asceticism resisted cultural creativity unsparingly, anchoring its ideal into the next world, while here, in this world, its only mission was to take care of life after death.

The idea about the purpose of life and existence is altogether different. It does not consist in the mortification of this world, but on the contrary, in its elevation and activation. Hence, its ideal lies in the earthly life and not in the next world. Thus, our idea of the meaning of life is to support earthly existence, profess its preeminence, sanctify its pursuit and absolutize its significance. Religion seems to descend

from heaven, the afterlife is revealed and the worldly life acquires religious sanction. According to the Book of Genesis, man is the crown of creation. God accomplished the process of creation by reconciling in a human being spirit and flesh, activity and passivity to the best measure. However, He left the rest of the material world uninspired, thus apparently predetermining the purpose of human existence as the same kind of reconciliation of active and passive momentums as manifested in His creation of man.

Thus, our purpose is to accomplish the work started by God and experience world creation initiated by Him. And if this holds true, our endless and tireless work does appear meaningful, our life in time assumes profound significance, while the latter acquires religious value.

A Person and the Meaning of Life

This is our understanding of life. However, it is likewise interesting to identify the agent of cultural creativity – whether it is a person or a different, more complex entity. Undoubtedly, every instance of creativity appears and develops only in the material world, which necessarily implies the unity of the spiritual and the physical. This unity is represented by a person, who possesses his individual physical as well as spiritual powers. Hence, it is obvious that the profound and significant goal defined above as the purpose of our life can only be accomplished within one's personal life and with one's individual powers. However, we come across an insurmountable obstacle: the easiness of destroying a person's life, causing one's death. How does this bear on cultural creativity?

Let us consider a simple living being, a small insect, an earthworm or an ant, which will be the best example for us. All of its life is constant toil and exertion to provide for its life as much as possible. It is common knowledge that colonies of ants display elements of social organization. They build dwellings that suit their needs, balance their economy and spend their short lives in building social relations. An ant colony, like a human society, rests on practicality and economy. Anyway, its social structure is built with the same earnestness as

the social edifice of humans. But what does it mean to kill one ant? It means nothing at all. Do we not often destroy the entire kingdom of ants without much scruple? What accounts for this startling cruelty of our action, why do we not hear the voice of conscience or suffer implacable pangs of remorse? Such unwonted peace of our mind toward this startling cruelty and ferocity must be supported by a certain kind of belief. It is the belief that the ant does not have any purpose in the world that its existence is extremely insignificant and therefore, the presence or absence of a couple of ants will neither add to nor subtract anything from the world. This is how we act and think in other situations as well. In a word, we measure the significance of any creature's life according to the purpose it serves. Let us consider a human life! Crushing an ant does not break the peace of our conscience, while deprivation of human life and the approach of human death provokes a sense of fear in our entire being and causes deep regret in all normal sensitive people.

Why does this happen?

If we believe that human life was created for a profound purpose, the accomplishment of this purpose seems impossible when human existence stops. This is what causes deep regret in us. This is the reason of our infinite fear in the face of the uncompromising approach of death.

Thus, it appears that the agent of the profound meaning of life is a person. But, let us assume that this purpose is to be served by a person discretely. What conclusions can we draw?

Every purpose implies respective accomplishment capacity. Otherwise, if we were not sure that we possess the power to accomplish our purpose, we would not have the desire to undertake it. We would think that this purpose does not match our powers and would not even try to accomplish it to avoid futile labour and loss of time. Thus, we believe that if one is supposed to aspire for the accomplishment of a purpose – provided there exists a purpose which is to be implemented (and it cannot be otherwise) – this purpose is to be accomplished with respective capacity. If there is no such agreement between the capacity

and the purpose to be accomplished with it, the potency of the purpose is a priori negative. The purpose that can never be accomplished with these powers is no longer the purpose for these powers. Hence, if human life serves a profound purpose, it should have sufficient powers to fulfil it. It should have strength and endurance in the right measure to match the magnitude of purpose.

But, is this indeed so? Unfortunately, not. An accidental oversight suffices to take a person's life. A tiny bullet may be enough to end our life; a drop of poison can be so strong relative to the resistance of human body that we cannot fight it; a small particle of dirt is enough to intoxicate our blood and stop our heartbeat forever; a minor involuntary prick of a thin lancet into the surface of our brain may end our busy life.

Thus, it is obvious that the major evil that we call death only needs a simple pretext to take our lives, which we believe were created to serve a profound purpose. It seems that life does not at all have sufficient protective powers to at least partly ensure the accomplishment of this purpose. And if so, it would be erroneous to think that the fulfilment of the profound purpose of existence is confined to a single person's life and capacities – indeed, if such a purpose exists, it cannot be accomplished with individual powers of a person. We should, therefore, look for a different subject.

Nation as the Agent of the Meaning of Life

Even if we do not agree with this idea, there is yet another argument that may prevent us from acknowledging a person as the subject accomplishing the meaning of life. It is the fact that personal activities are completely dependent.

If we consider cultural activities, we will see that they need soil to germinate and mature. It is the space where materials accumulate and are processed. However, neither the passive material, which the active spirit is to permeate and make accessible for others as well, nor the active spirit itself is invariably uniform. The diversity of the former is rooted in disparate natural conditions that bring forth different kinds

of natural gifts in different places, while the diversity of the latter is caused by differing past experiences, which too are closely related to diverse natural conditions. Indeed, the first sensation, the first aspiration and desire at the time when the spiritual life of a human took first steps toward revival, should have certainly been dependent on the physical aspects of the outer world, which varies in different places. Hence, spiritual sensations associated with them should have been a priori different. The individual nature once acquired by the meaning of spiritual life is never lost. On the contrary, it conditions deeper differences and peculiarities in the future. This happens because the spiritual life of a human is a living stream which allocates a permanent niche in its unfathomable depths to a sensation once experienced and an impression once received, and never loses it. And as each new impression, new sensation is refracted through the prism of the earlier one and is tinted accordingly, the more complex the composition of past sensations, the more peculiar the shades of new sensations are expected to be. However, a new impression, new sensation is not tied to the past ones only in this manner. There is also another kind of dependence: the content which our consciousness acquired in the past influences the direction of its working and consequently, it is in this direction that our consciousness receives new impressions.

Thus are shaped the inclinations of our soul that we call interests. As the same natural environment is inhabited by a group of people, their spiritual faculties develop mutual likeness, are filled with similar aspirations and guided by similar interests as they receive the same impressions. This spiritual unity underlies the ability of mutual understanding and empathy, and naturally, generates willingness to organize collective life and agreement to share the yoke. This is a strong social bond that unites them into a nation, which itself serves as a new consolidating basis for their ongoing spiritual life. From now on, it is not possible to think and feel apart. Every moment of the working of a person's spiritual life is closely tied to his thought and emotion.

Thus a person only builds on a common ground and is not able to carry on without it. From now on, his private thoughts and sensations

are not the only ones that penetrate the deep streams of his spiritual life and add shades to it. Collective sensations become inherent in the integrity of his spiritual life. Therefore, his assessments and emotions is no longer just his: the complex entity of which he has become a part acts, thinks and feels in him.

This is the reason why we cannot argue that an individual person is the subject of cultural creativity. And if we also bear in mind the difficulty of breaking and destroying a national entity, it will be clear that cultural creativity can only be accomplished at the level of complex entities or nations, and that otherwise it is impossible to fulfil the profound purpose that underlies our existence.

The Problem of War

Now let us consider the problem of war. The life of each person is the highest value for individual outcomes. Therefore, death as the end of the life chain, being its last links, is perceived as the source of petrifying fear. However, we seem to change substantially when a war unfolds. The natural fear in the face of the sharp scythe of death, deeply rooted in our nature, seems to vanish forever. The chill bones of the deadly skeleton seem to be filled with attractive and amiable spirit. Its lethal handshake seems to warm up our being as a greeting from our bosom friend whom we miss. Therefore, thousands of young people venture to meet death willingly and proudly, while the news about the violate destruction of our enemies feel us with endless joy and delight.

Regret, whether at the prospect of one's own death or someone else's murder, is alien at warfare. This surprising and mysterious faculty of our soul has already been mentioned above, when we found it inexplicable. But now that the mystery of our existence has been unveiled, it is clear that death or homicide on the battlefield cannot be perceived otherwise.

Indeed, why should the fact of death provoke fear at any moment of our life? The purpose of human existence is not happiness; it lies beyond the limits of our subjective life – in the accomplishment of an objective value. Then it is no surprise that the objective meaning of

life, which is independent from us and is fulfilled without any mediation and guidance, may not reckon with us and compel us to take steps that may seem inappropriate and unclear to our mind. How would it be the purpose of life if it had a tendency to lose preeminence and be dispelled under certain life circumstances? As we have seen, it is only to our mind that death invariably appears meaningless. On the other hand, for the objective purpose of life, even if it concerns an individual – no matter how confident our mind might be, and our senses fostered by it – death is not meaningless if dictated by the interests of life. Thus, in such moments, despite the ordinary assessment and viewpoints generated by our mind, the perception of its purpose emerges from the hidden depths of a human being and, by the working of natural and spontaneous belief, compels us to see death as a noble action and murder as heroism.

Thus, in our judgment, war may appear to be an event inherently associated with the purposeful flow of life. War seems to be caused by the purpose of life, serve it and hence be necessary and desirable. But is it so? It will not be difficult to answer this question if we adhere to our path of judgment and do not abandon our standpoint. The purpose of life is the continuation of the work of God – it is the inspiration and animation of the whole world, while the subject. i. e. agent capable to accomplish it is the spirit of a nation. The national spirit is the air which each individual member of a nation inhales. It is a unity created by the first shared impressions forming the content of consciousness. This unity is the basis for similar assessments and acquisition of new impressions. It is thus the choice of the same way to development, and as the future always ensues from and is defined by the past and the present, the national spirit is the aspiration toward an explicit shape of future culture.

This is the national spirit.

Nation as the Agent of the Meaning of Life

From this point of view, the depth of differences marking national spirits becomes obvious; and since re-birth is inconceivable – to the

extent that abandonment of one's path and return is not possible in spiritual life, as return would mean the experience of the past, which in turn would become a new indelible element of spiritual life to reinforce, and not abolish, its discrete nature relative to others – dilution and assimilation of one living nation with another equals the former's death and complete destruction.

This event would lead to the loss of one subject of the meaning of life and, consequently, would mark an obstruction, and not a contribution, in the accomplishment of the general purpose of existence.

Thus, the meaning of life requires full accomplishment of the interests of each national spirit. However, as there are multiple nations, the true meaning of life and its objective purpose will only be implemented and will only maintain its genuine character if the interests of different nations are not substantially conflicting, lack antagonism and are able to develop and be accomplished concurrently. To sum up, for the true meaning of life, the solidarity of nations is not merely a favourable condition but a mandatory one.

However, history offers a different picture. It discloses frequent instances of strife among nations and expansionist aspirations. It seems to always assure us that the idea of the solidarity of nations is the fruit of utopists' and idlers' unruly fancy, and that the implausibility of this idea is perfectly proved by numberless wars that overflow the vessel of our historical past. Indeed, the clash of nations and strife is a historical fact. But does it prove the impossibility of the harmonious development of nations and hence, the falsity of our concept of the meaning of life?

Modern wars, as well as most of the past ones, have almost always been caused by the so-called "economic" interests. A nation either needs new markets or new lands for its increasing population, which may compel it to cross the borders of another nation's interests. The latter nation, whose interests have suffered, naturally and legitimately, offers resistance to the infringer. The clash almost invariably leads to a war. However, economic interests do not at all require the infringement upon others' interests. If a nation seek to expand its economy

or secure necessary resources for its population to survive, there is another way to achieve these goals – a way that is more natural and noble. The powers of human soul are infinite and there are endless opportunities to employ natural resources. It is necessary to consolidate spiritual powers, penetrate the realm of nature and explore its mysteries. In a word, it is necessary to exert all efforts for the development of spiritual treasures. However, it is not only the external nature that needs to be explored and animated. The opportunities for state, public and other kinds of establishment also belong to the domain of passive natural momentums and need to be permeated and explored to identify their best forms. In this way, we will be able to meet all our needs, whether economic or other.

* * *

Problems emerging in the life of a nation are normally to be addressed through the advancement, development and activation of its spiritual potential. However, some nations prefer immobility and indolence over progress and action. They look for easier ways to satisfy their needs: invade other nations and strive to satiate their own interests through the absorption of these nations.

Thus, we can see that warfare is not in a nation's real interests. On the contrary, it is the betrayal of the true interests of the national spirit, which, as we know, finds its purpose in constant development and advancement and not in enfeeblement, frustration and suspension of development. War enfeebles the interests of the invaded nation and suspends the spiritual creativity of the invader, which seeks to satisfy its needs through the frustration of another nation's interests instead of creating new forms.

Thus, the meaning of life per se does not require war as a device for its accomplishment. It does not cause a war, but once a war outbreaks, it tries to gain control over it and channel it toward its interests. From the perspective of the meaning of life, war is not necessary for the nation that has started it, but can be destructive for the nation against which it is waged. Thus, the invading nation runs counter to the objective purpose of life, while the defending nation is concerned

with the protection of its identity, development and purpose, and therefore, is attuned to the meaning of life.

Thus, human consciousness, if it reflects in its deep nooks at least a tiny particle of the meaning of life, develops a dual attitude to war. When a war is defensive, the efforts and powers of each person are aimed at the protection of their national identity and existence, i. e. at the accomplishment of the purpose of life. In this case, people sacrifice their lives with delight and exaltation. The normal human fear of death makes way for heroic self-sacrifice. Different groups within the invaded nation, which used to be at odds, consolidate in surprising unanimity and even those who used to object to warfare openly, change their minds immediately and fight the enemy with a weapon in their hands. Those who used to harbour a grudge against their neighbor, or shudder in horror at the sight of blood, being unable to even kill an insect, have now turned into savage soldiers fighting the enemy with fire and sword. Only a defensive war can give birth to such fascinating personalities as, for example, Joan of Arc, the national heroine of France. However, when a war is offensive, when it infringes on another nation's interests and aims to weaken it, strong antagonism develops in the deep nooks of one's consciousness, slowly but surely. War is perceived as the greatest evil and self-sacrifice and heroism become a rarity. Fear and cowardliness in the face of war germinate and spread in the community as a contagious disease. The number of traitors gradually increases – the meaning of life thus punishes severely those who have chosen to avoid challenges and take easier paths. So, we see that a defensive war usually generates a heroic spirit – a state for which fear and avoidance of death is alien. On the other hand, an offensive war serves as a fertile soil for fear, cowardliness and malcontent toward war-makers. We already know the reasons. In the first case, a nation is offended and its interests are threatened – i. e. the agent of the purpose of life is oppressed. This contradicts the meaning of life. Hence, a nation that defends itself in fact protects the accomplishment of the meaning of life. In this case, a war turns into heroism, while in the second case, it contravenes the meaning of life and does

not inspire heroism and exaltation. Naturally, such a war should not be heroic and passionate. However, an offensive war may turn into self-defense, especially when the invaded nation appears to be more powerful. A good example is the ongoing warfare launched by the German government. It started as an offensive war but has taken a different turn, and it became clear from the very beginning that the defeat of the Germans would lead to the punishment and demotion of the entire German nation.

Thus, the offensive war has turned into defensive. The Germans feel that they do not only fight to expand their national interests, but also to preserve their identity. Only this can explain the extreme interest in the war that has gripped the entire German society.

If an offensive war is the pursuit of a wrong path of the meaning of life and a defensive war is in its direct service, the former should invariably end in defeat and the latter in victory. Otherwise, the meaning of life as posited by us will not be the genuine meaning of life. The concept of the meaning of life implies the idea of channeling the entire course of life toward it and putting to its service all life momentums. Therefore, it must be accomplished in every fact of existence and none of these facts should contradict it. If we turn the pages of history, we will often come across the moments when this statement holds true. Take, for example, the Persian war against Greece. It is common knowledge that the Persian army largely outnumbered the Greek, which made the latter's defeat almost certain. However, the Greeks' efforts were only directed toward self-defense which along with other factors, filled them with resilient and invincible spirit. As a result, the numerous Persian army was defeated. We call this exaltation of spirit the moral force. It accounts for the unexpected outcomes of many wars. However, the chronicle of wars has preserved different stories as well. Let us consider the Punic Wars. As you know, the outcome was the fall of Carthage, while according to our theory, we would rather expect the Carthaginians' victory. However, the moral factor is not the only one that matters. An important role is played by external factors as well, including strategic geographical position, the size of an army

and military equipment. Carthage did not have its own army to confront the numerous Roman legions. The trade-oriented Carthaginians did not pay much attention to their military development. They had money and believed that money would enable them to hire any kind of army they wished. However, a hired soldier from a foreign country is most likely to be a poor defender of the national interests that are foreign to him. Therefore, it no surprise that Carthage fell.

Thus, the Punic Wars do not contradict but corroborate our views. Indeed, only a defensive war can generate such heroes as great Hannibal. Especially remarkable is the last Punic war. When Carthage was doomed to an eventual fall, its citizens were gripped by a marvelous spirit of fortitude: the numerous Roman army found it difficult to overcome the resistance of the single defiant city and almost lost the battle. However, the Romans' superior numbers and armoury outweighed the selfless vigour and heroism, and Carthage fell.

You can see that the vector of the Carthaginians' life and disposition speaks more in favour of our theory than the Roman victory does against it.

Thus, the fact of the war as such fundamentally contradicts the main vector of the meaning of life. And this is exactly what accounts for the surprising evidence that a defensive war may become a non-exhaustive source of self-sacrifice and heroism, and a small and weak nation may frequently come out the winner in its fight against more powerful countries. However, eventually, the meaning of life re-routes the diversely erroneous and inappropriate forms of human actions to its regular course and channels all areas of life toward its streams. Evidently, the time will come when we will put an end to the futile and senseless waste of our energy. The time ought to come when war, together with other evils, is carried away by the waves of oblivion. However, questions on how this will happen and whether the ongoing warfare is the last link of the blood-washed chain connecting cultured humankind to its savage ancestors make a completely different issue that lies beyond the scope of this essay.

PART II

COMMENTS ON DIMITRI UZNADZE'S WORKS

DIMITRI UZNADZE'S WORK "FORMS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR"

Rusudan Mirtskhulava

D. Uznadze's work "Forms of Human Behavior" was published in 1941 for the first time. The author presented definition and classification of behavior based on the theoretical concept, the set theory. Later, "Forms of Behavior" was attached to the work "Child Psychology, School-Age Psychology" (Uznadze, 1947; Uznadze, 1997). D. Uznadze, the founder of Georgian psychology and experimental pedagogy, considered the psychology of behavior in the process of the child's development.

According to D. Uznadze's theoretical model, behavior can be triggered by subjective need and objective environment (object). Environment does not directly influence behavior; it affects the subject of the behavior and makes him/her ready for this behavior. "The external reality, the object ... causes a relevant set" (See p. 19 in this book). Uznadze notes that the set phenomenon gives the possibility to understand the feasibility of the behavior as it is based on the interaction of two factors – subjective need and objective reality.

D. Uznadze's classification of behavior is based on the subject's need (the subjective factor of the set, "the motor of the activity"). The author has grouped two main categories of needs: object needs and activity needs. Object (substantial) need causes exterogenic behavior (practical-objective behavior) that requires a particular external object (e. g. food need– food). Exterogenic behavior is finished after meeting the need or obtaining the appropriate object. This kind of behavior seems to be impulsive (takes its impulse from the object) and produced from "external source" (exterogenic). The forms of extero-

genic behavior are: consumption, care, service, curiosity, work and labor. Uznadze unites all these forms of behavior with one common name – “work” (Uznadze, 1947).

The so-called introgenic behavior, caused by the activity need is relatively “independent” from external objects and self-sufficient. D. Uznadze notes that the natural state of human being is active; this innate and universal need of activity is called *functional tendency*. Functional tendency is initiated by the momentum of the forces of the subject. Introgenic behaviors include the play, fun, aesthetic enjoyment, artistic creativity and sport. All these forms of behavior are given by Uznadze a common name – “game”. As for the learning, the author considers it as a kind of intermediate behavior form between the play and the work as it has the signs of both types of behavior. In accordance with the needs of the object and activity, D. Uznadze points to the two basic instincts of the organism, such as defensive (related to the need for object) and functional (related to the need for activity).

D. Uznadze indicates that the exterogetic and introgenic forms of behavior do not distinguish clearly between the two. The subjective sense is of paramount importance in determination of the type of conduct; each form of behavior may acquire introgenic nature, if its real impulse is not an external object (food, livelihood, resources, etc.), but the need for activation of the internal forces of the subject or functional tendency. For example, work may become a play if the real purpose of the subject is not to obtain a certain product (i. e. specific benefit – R. M.), but to activate the subjective forces freely and enjoy it.

Functional tendency as a universal instinctive mechanism is associated with early stages of phylo – and ontogenesis, although it stays effective in case of the developed psychic. Uznadze notes that the adult human’s attitude towards environment is not confined only by practical-utilitarian activity. The play as a free expression of subjective forces is not and should not be associated only with childhood. Introgenic behavior (play, fun, artistic creativity, aesthetic perception, sport) is characteristic of any stage of human development. Moreover,

according to Uznadze, "free play of forces" is absolutely necessary for a human being" (See p. 35 in this book).

D. Uznadze's concepts of "functional tendency" and "introgenic-exterogenic behavior" should be considered in terms of concepts with similar semantic. These are the concepts: intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, "motive or meta-need for growth" – Maslow; "exploratory needs" – Montgomery, Butler; "need to relieve boredom" – Myers, Zimbardo, Miller; "manipulation need" – Harlow, Davis; "need for sensation seeking" – Zuckerman, "striving to discover" – Murphy, "motivation for attaining competence" – Watt; "functional autonomy" – Allport; "interest-excitement" or "drive-free behavior" – Izard, "act hunger" – Moreno and etc. (Brown, 2007; Deci, 1971; Deci, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1991; Izard, 1991; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbet, 1973; Lepper & Greene, 2015; Malone & Lepper, 1987; Marinak & Gambrell, 2008; Moreno, 1946; Myers, 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Ryan & Deci, 2000b; Vallerand, 1992; Wilson & Lassister, 1982).

It should be noted that the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are the cardinal concepts of modern social, educational and humanistic psychology. The importance of the intrinsic motivation phenomenon in contemporary psychology clearly reflects the separately stated personality factor of the openness to the experiences in the 5-factor model of the individual or in the "Big Five", which, along with other characteristics, is related to self-actualization, autonomy, intensity impressions and challenges pragmatism and routine (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2009).

Intrinsic motivation has been actively studied in psychology since the 1970s, but this type of behavior was mentioned back in the ancient world; Aristotle calls this stimulus of behavior in "Nicomachean Ethics" as a "stimulus of life" and its subjects – "happy men", who get satisfaction from the activity itself and not from the result achieved. In contemporary interpretation, intrinsic motivation is an element of motivation system that implies specific stimulation of an individual; the behavior stimulated by it is not aimed at a particular outcome; it lends itself to the positive emotional meanings and causes

the processual and consequential positive feelings. Many groups of authors examine the efficacy of behavior in different conditions of motivation. An intrinsic motivation scaling method has been developed (Vallerand, 1992).

With regard to contemporary psychology's interest (educational psychology, social psychology, and humanistic psychology) in the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation, there still are many unanswered questions. Most importantly, modern research work does not have a single theoretical foundation and researchers rely on the compilation of different theoretical views (such as Weiner's "attribution theory", Bandura's perception of self-effectiveness, locus of control and goal orientation). From this point of view, Uznadze's phenomenon of functional tendency, which is considered in the unified system of set theory, deserves special emphasis.

Unlike the above-mentioned contemporary views, D. Uznadze unites the key phenomena of set psychology, such as the functional tendency, the feelings ready for actualization and the set in the unified concept. For example, in the 1936 edition of "The Sleep and the Dream" D. Uznadze defined the set as willingness to activate feelings or functional tendency of feelings (Uznadze, 2004); the author points out that there are feelings in the unconsciousness only in the form of functional tendency or willingness to activate. In the sense of the author, stimulus of fantasy, as well as its content is the functional tendency of the psychic forces of the subject or the "un-manifested" sets. Dream and in general, the act of fantasy is understood by the author as the implementation of the unrealized functions. In the sense of the author, in dream the psychic, obeying the effect of functional tendency, begins not forceful (i. e. stimulated by the external forces) but free, spontaneous action, and creates its (desired or relevant –R. M.) object. The stimulus of fantasy as well as its content, is the functional tendency of the psychic forces of the subjects, or in Uznadze's words, "un-manifested" sets (Uznadze, 1943). D. Uznadze pointed to the catharsis effect of dreams – the dream, due to its spontaneous nature, slows down the intensity of functional tendencies and thus relates to

the catharsis mechanism of self-regulation of the psychic; "the dream should somehow release the tense feeling of functional tendency of our psychic in the direction of the set" (Uznadze, 2004 p. 62). The functional tendency gets its realization by transforming into the set, with the particular intention. This transformation also has the catharsis effect in the phenomenon of dreams.

D. Uznadze views the set as a functional tendency with a particular intention which gets the direction and definition by certain objective conditions. Based on the effect of these conditions diffusive, non-specific functional tendency forms specific set that, in turn, stimulates the concrete behavior. Functional tendency is the universal drive to activity (Modern empirical studies on animals confirmed the universality of the need for activity. Studies have shown that the organism gets involved in the play and exploration activities even without incentives-awards.), which gets the intentions and the direction from the set influenced by specific environmental conditions.

As mentioned above, according to D. Uznadze's theoretical model, the functional tendency as a universal instinctive mechanism is characteristic for the early stages of phylo – and ontogenesis. Under the influence of environmental conditions, the general and universal functional tendency is differentiated into the specific intentionsets in the developed psychic stage. Adult human behavior takes practical and pragmatic character. Consequently, with the increase in age, exterogenic behaviors substitute introgenic behaviors. However, the functional tendency in its direct form (as introgenic behavior) is evident at this stage, and in the sense of set theory, it can influence as catharsis (psycho-hygienic or psychotherapeutic – R. M.) on the subject's psychic.

The practical significance of the work "Forms of Human Behavior" should also be emphasized. As we already mentioned, D. Uznadze, as the founder of Georgian psychology and experimental pedagogy, discussed behavior psychology and classification in terms of child development. More precisely, the child's development has been linked to the process of the development of behavior (from introgenic forms – in the direction of exterogenic forms). Learning in the Uznadze's concept of

behavior is the basic form of child behavior, and it has dual nature; it is simultaneously exterogenic and introgenic; it is playing and working. This dual nature of learning is the key to the effectiveness of teaching; increasing the role and significance of the functional tendency of a student (introgenic aspect) and increasing the positive emotions of the process increases the efficiency of study material as well as the ability to identify and develop the skills of the student. Consequently, taking into consideration the dual nature of learning, we should develop and use the strategies (study with play strategies) that will facilitate the functional tendency of the student in the learning process. It should also be noted that psychology of modern education and self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1975) attributes great importance to stimulating intrinsic motivation in the teaching process and developing relevant strategies for its stimulation (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Ryan & Deci 2000b). Moreover, social psychological studies have demonstrated that frequent external encouragement (rewarding) may result in a decrease-reducing of motivation of the behavior (the so-called phenomenon of over justification).

Activation of functional tendency (involving the introgenic aspect in behavior, and positive emotions associated with it) is necessary condition for the effectiveness of the behavior (and not only the study behavior) and realization of the subject. At the same time, the realization of functional tendency is associated with catharsis effect. In this sense, D. Uznadze's views are interestingly echoed by the act hunger and acting-out phenomena in the psycho-therapy method of J. Moreno's psychodrama (Moreno, 1946). Psychology of set can make a significant contribution in understanding these phenomena and their relationship with expression or catharsis phenomena.

D. Uznadze introduced the classification model of behavior, in which introgenic and exterogenic forms of behavior are founded on the theoretical concept of the set theory. As the author of set psychology, Uznadze reviewed individual forms of behavior in their ontogenesis, individual development and presented recommendations for their elaboration.

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DIMITRI UZNADZE ON EDUCATION ISSUES: “PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY” AND “FORMS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR”

Ketevan Makashvili

The work “Psychology and Pedagogy” was published in 1941, and it is chronologically between the early works of the author dedicated to education issues and the works about the set theory that has been completed in that period (Uznadze, 1941). D. Uznadze as a daring innovator of pedagogical practices and a diligent researcher of psychology was trying to follow the principle of parity between psychology and pedagogy. He was trying to avoid the tendency of psychologisation in pedagogy, but at the same time he wanted to show the connection that should necessarily exist between these two disciplines, provided that psychology takes into account the claims against it that has been existing since XIX century not only by pedagogy, but also by other sciences, which expect help from psychology in the analysis of the events, but cannot see its effectiveness.

The author discusses the connection of this problem with the central theme of his works, the *active subject*. He emphasizes that traditional empirical psychology often explores the different practices of human being (learning, playing, and working) but does not consider them as practices of an active subject, and does not even consider them the way they exist in real life. In this work the author presents the solution of pedagogic tasks as a test to check the correctness of the *immediacy postulate* between psychic functions and the environment, which is characteristic to the traditional psychology. By analyzing pedagogical practice, Uznadze concludes that the common pedagogical practice to influence the psychic (i. e. directly target a child’s mind-

set, emotions, and desires) in the process of adolescent development does not meet the expectations. Thus, the postulate of immediacy is useless and may even be harmful for pedagogy.

According to the author, for effective pedagogic impacts it is necessary to master and study the whole active structure of the human being (adolescent). Uznadze produces the detailed description of functioning of such a structure through the concept of *set*. The author emphasizes two forms of set: a) set as a characteristic of the subject and b) set as the willingness of the subject for activity. It is important that set psychology considers the integrity of the subject (personality) and its actions as an indivisible reality. As the author notes himself, the existence of such a methodological platform provides absolutely exceptional possibilities to study *learning*, *teaching* and *development* processes as well as solving their practical problems. The unique possibility is that by using this methodological platform, the author suggests uniting traditional psychology's valuable knowledge of psychic functions and thus transferring the system to a new level. Uznadze sees the basis for this in the empirically proven phenomenon of the set; through the interaction with the environment, first of all, the set or the subject as a whole changes, and not his psychic or behavior acts (Uznadze, 1941). In his early work, he points to the observation that the distinguished, so-called "gifted" teachers are intuitively carrying out the childcare practices that are oriented to the whole personality; they take into consideration the anticipations of the adolescent's set, and they avoid the incompatibility between the goals of adolescent and the teacher, that Uznadze calls "the main tragedy of the upbringing" (Uznadze, 1912a). Positivistic viewpoints make the researcher face the problem that it is impossible to multiply such an intuitive understanding, while the education system needs not just one or two genius pedagogues but many corporations of teachers and caregivers. In connection with this issue, Uznadze introduces the term of teacher's "mastery" (Uznadze, 1912b). By adopting this formulation, Uznadze emphasizes the need and ability to develop specific operational schemes in learning and especially in the upbringing through

consolidating both the colossal empiric material accumulated in psychology and the systemic vision of set psychology.

In D. Uznadze's work pertinent to education the author describes the spiral strategy of research – from concrete practical experience to systematic theoretical generalization, which is verified by more extensive empirical material for further clarification. The considered work is remarkable in this regard. This small work of theoretical nature, as we have already mentioned, was preceded by the works of natural observation and quasi experiments. One of the examples is "Society of Enlightenment Women's School Report for School Year 1915/16". The work in the Women's School has actually functioned as an experimental laboratory for pedagogic principles based on new, active subjects. *The role of critical thinking, the primacy of teaching and learning processes over actual knowledge, learning by doing, spontaneous sharing of knowledge* in the process of learning, introduction of the *evaluation for learning* along with learning assessment, the development of the operational system for establishing self-regulation based on a holistic approach, and other principles in practice adds almost incredible modernity to the report written exactly 100 years ago.

Both for psychology and pedagogy, theorists and practitioners there are especially important the works that Uznadze wrote in the last decade of his life. The work "Psychology and Pedagogy" includes the phrase: "The point is that the concept of set itself has a special pedagogic value, and so special that it will probably become one of the fundamental concepts of the pedagogy in future" (See p. 64 in this book). The author left this phrase to consider not only for future generations. The author added two more concepts of the set psychology, *the functionality tendency* and *the age-related environment*, which are related with the child's development and teaching and learning issues (Uznadze, 1947). Through the interaction of these two concepts, Uznadze continues to process the principle of *coincidence* of internal and external factors of active subject. In this extended model of set theory, sometimes the subjective factor of set may be presented not only by the need for any object but also by the system of internal forces

ready to be activated, so-called functional tendency, which produces free behavioral forms (play, artistic creations, fun, etc.). Uznadze calls them forms introgenic behavior. The age-related environment, as the construct determining the forms of compulsory behavior in a certain age, is in the complimentary relationship with introgenic behavior – the child's mature forces that do not become activated by the age-related environment as compulsory, serious, exterogenic behaviors, reveal as introgenic behaviors. Allocation of introgenic and exterogenic behavior forms creates more specific situation in terms of learning behavior.

The fact that according to Uznadze's view, learning is the transitional form between the introgenic and exterogenic behaviors, will once again ponder the psychological specificity of learning as a form of behavior. Learning is oriented towards functional development like introgenic forms of behavior, which implies matching the maturity of the function and the given material. However, in case of learning behavior, we do not deal with natural compliance as it occurs during the game, but with cultural compliance that requires special attention to the content provided. Supposedly, Uznadze suggested this attention to the material particularly in the era of extreme cultural changes, because in his opinion the complexes of functional systems carry out the peculiarities of culture and thus facilitate realization of the introgenic aspect of the learning behavior. As for the exterogenic aspect of learning behavior, that is, what the age-related environment, or school system, requires from the subject of the learning behavior, is that he/she should have the skills of knowledge acquisition or the need to develop these skills, and therefore *objectivate* the learning process, and not to acquire knowledge or to develop specific ability as an opportunity to meet other needs. Based on the above criteria and based on empirical data, Uznadze considers seven years as the school entry age (Uznadze, 1948); his "Primary Interests at School Age" is the empirical study related to this issue. The author is interested in experimental study of the intellectual function as the primary function in the primary school age and supports the credibility of his assumptions with

several sources of data. Continuation of nuance theoretical analysis of learning as a form of behavior is a good example of research tradition established by D. Uznadze by collecting empirical data from various sources related to the issue.

In general, the nomothetic platform of the set psychology, and its main work constructs at the same time require and provide availability not only to extend the existing research strategies within the school of set, but to start detection/accumulation of a new type of data with different designs of a mixed research, which will be beneficiary both for psychology and pedagogy (general as well as special) to clarify the issues raised by Uznadze that are still actual.

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**DIMITRI UZNADZE'S THEORY OF SET AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS INFLUENCE OF THE EXPERIENCE
CONTENTS ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION
("PRIMING")**

Dali Parjanadze

There are problems in contemporary psychology, which, in spite of the well-established facts on the description level, cannot be explained from psychology's fundamental position. One of these problems is "priming" – the unconscious revelation and behavioral impact of past experiences. According to the widely held opinion, the concept of priming implies the effect of the activation of implicit memory. By Baddeley's definition, priming is a change of a behavior or any behavioral parameter, which is influenced neither by the past experience, nor by the consciousness of the individual, or the personality (Baddeley, 1997). The concept of "priming"¹ is a relatively new concept, however, the fact, in its essence, is not new.

The fact that the memory is directly related to the unconscious can be stated from the superficial description of the memory function itself – the memory in the latent state is nothing more than the contents stored in the unconscious. In his classic work published in 1905 Hering wrote: "On examining more closely, we see plainly that memory is a faculty not only of our conscious states, but also, and much more so, of our unconscious ones. I was conscious of this or that yesterday, and am again conscious of it today. Where has it been

1 In the priming experiments there are two components – the prime or the stimulus, and the aim, or target. Usually, in everyday situations people may not notice the prime in a practice, but in the experimental situation the prime is necessary to see the result of its effect.

meanwhile? It does not remain continuously within my consciousness, nevertheless it returns after having quitted it. Our ideas tread but for a moment upon the stage of consciousness, and then go back again behind the scenes, to make way for others in their place. Between the “me” of today and the “me” of yesterday lie night and sleep, abysses of unconsciousness; nor is there any bridge but memory with which to span them... The bond of union, therefore, which connects the individual phenomena of our consciousness, lies in our unconscious world” (Hering, 1905).

Research of unconscious forms of memory has been conducted in several directions. Of course, one of these directions we cannot ignore was Freud’s theory and memory interpretation (which is known as motivational unconscious, and it is less interesting for cognitive psychology). One of the founders of the other direction was Ebbinghaus, who developed the classification of the memory forms, and mentioned the third form of memory along with the conscious memory forms; he also confirmed the existence of this unconscious form of memory (with the savings method). (This form of memory was called implicit memory by Schachter). This fact dispels the myth that the only memory Ebbinghaus was interested in was the consciousness, and this last form of memory became especially interesting for cognitive psychology that formed after a few decades. The fact that implicit memory has the ability to change the behavior (modern name – priming) was demonstrated in 1911 by a well-known Swiss psychologist and psychiatrist Claparède by the example of an amnesic patient (Claparède, 1911). Then, for a few decades, research has almost ceased in this direction, and it was revived in the 1980s, with a vital research by Warrington and Weiskrantz, in which they found that amnesic patients did not have damaged the function of transferring the information in the long-term memory as it had previously been presumed, but they had implicit memory problems instead (Warrington & Weiskrants, 1968). Modern theories of memory, whether it is a multisystem theory of memory currently popular in the neuroscience, or Rumelhart’s connectionist model of processing levels, in spite their

interesting findings to explain the origin of the memory processes, are not enough to present and explain the full picture of the influence of past experiences on the behavior.

At the same time, there is ongoing observation, accounting and recording ecologically valuable experimental material on common priming situations. The area of the influence of priming is enormous – it has both negative and positive impacts on the individual psychic processes (perception, memory, and emotion), problem solving, and social relationships. In recent years the attention of the researchers has dramatically changed to the detection of priming in the spheres of social cognition and interpersonal relationships (Mindadze, 2018). In authors' research interesting experimental facts of priming are accumulated in the spheres of stereotypes and attitudes. Materials are obtained regarding cultural influences. At the same time, Bargh as well as other researchers note that all these facts lack theoretical, conceptual understanding (Bargh, 2006). The priming is very frequent phenomenon and it can have a dramatic impact on our behaviors. That is why it is important to determine the psychological mechanism which is responsible for the influence of past experiences on the subject's behavior.

This issue represents a wider problem than just memory. Memory concept is reviewed very extensively, and it really has a huge role in the psychic reality formation and definition. However, none of the above mentioned memory theories are able to fully solve the issues regarding how the psychic is reflected into reality, in what form the experiences are stored in the subconscious, and what is the psychological mechanism that provides the involvement of the same information in the actual behavior during the problem solving, or promotes a particular behavior that people consciously are not aware (information level) of existing (but on the unconscious level it is “known” and anticipated). The contemporary memory theories are aimed at explaining the progress of memory as a relatively independent psychic process. At the level of explanation of the facts, there are really interesting opinions expressed and relevant models presented. The model of prototypes, properties,

activation and other models, in fact, correspond to the actual material and each of them emphasizes the diversity of the psychic. But all these diverse forms should be united in the general psychological theory of psychic, the theory that encompasses the possibility to reflect the reality in the psychic, its mechanism and specifics, which will unite into one system the goal, the essence and the mechanism of the psychic processes and their reflection in behaviors. In addition, recent memory theories, for instance, the theory of activation and the connectionism theories based on it, look more like the models that show the analogy to the nervous system than a psychological conception.

Bargh, one of the most important authors in social cognition, writes that it is time to leave the childhood behind (meaning the period of facts accumulation) and seek for answers to questions: 1. What is the reason for a wide variety of priming (meaning its impact on diverse psychological systems – perception, motivation, behavior, assessment), and 2. How does it impact the human behavior so that the people do not know about. Bargh further elaborated these questions and formulated the following: Is priming controllable? How is it related to conscious and intentional behavior? How is it possible that the same stimulus (prime) has qualitatively different results? If there are two parallel primes at the same time, how do they interact with each other? Which of them “wins” in case of conflict? In what cases does the priming emerge easier? What supports priming? Is it possible that individual differences affect priming? (Bargh, 2006).

Studies on this issue require a relevant general psychological and methodological position. A theory capable of providing answers to these questions, in turn, should recognize that there are no separate functions that are operational, but the whole person is; the theory should also recognize the principle of psychic development and pre-conscious levels of perception. It should assume the existence of a specific instance of perception at the unconscious level as well as the related (unconscious) possibilities in the process of interaction.

Because of the format limitations of this article, we will focus only on some of the issues related to the priming, and we will try to dis-

Discuss them based on Dimitri Uznadze's set theory. First of all, we will discuss the question of past experiences at the unconscious level to enable them in the actual environment for the subject. One of the major values of Dimitri Uznadze's set theory (which is, unfortunately, not so well known to the broader psychological community due to a lot of objective or subjective reasons) is the understanding of the subject as an instance mediating the relationship between an objective reality and the psyche. The concept of subject was not a new concept in psychology, but Uznadze added a new content to the meaning of the subject. According to Uznadze, the subject is not a simple interaction of the individual mental processes, because in this case, memory will not be the function of the whole person but the independent function with its own mechanism. According to D. Uznadze, any relationship between a stimulus and a response is always mediated by a single instance. Such an instance is the whole living subject, and the mechanism through which the above mentioned mediation is implemented is the set.

The content implied in Uznadze's concept of the set completely differs from the various definitions of this concept (Attitude, Einstellung, Ustanovka, or Set in behavioral theories) that are widely used in psychology. When describing the set let us follow the logic offered by D. Uznadze: a living being is indifferent to the environment as long as it does not have any needs. However, as soon as a need arises, the environment influences it in a way that helps it meet this need. Thus, the environment turns into a situation in which the need is satisfied. This situation does not affect any single function but the agent as a whole. As a result, the convergence of the need and a situation favorable for this need forms a specific state – a set.

The set is an unconscious state when the living organism for the first time reflects the relationship with reality and prepares for the future reasonable behavior. The physical and mental efforts of the subject are mobilized in the set for the purpose of conducting an appropriate behavior. As we can see, set is the readiness for a behavior, its engine that strives to realize itself or be realized. This behavior is

already anticipated in the set. No behavior can be conducted without a proper set. The outline of future behavior is already given in the set. Thus, "Human behavior can be activated without a person's own cognitive, emotional and volitional acts. It can be activated on the basis of his/her set which expresses not a particular psychic function but the whole of a person as such" (Uznadze, 1961).

Since the set is a latent – unconscious variable, it is impossible to observe it. The question is how can be managed the experimental study of this unconscious event, and this question was easily and originally solved by D. Uznadze: he was able to work out an experimental method where the set was revealed as a visible reaction. In this experiment, which is known as the method of fixed set, the person experiences the same behavior as a result of multiple repeats (haptic assessment of the large and small balls with right and left hands). Eventually the set forms, which induces an inadequate – illusory behavior during the critical experiment. When the situation alters, the person misperceives the equal balls as different ones.

The fact that the set is a whole and non-localized phenomenon is seen in the analysis of the experiment results of the set tested in hypnotic position. After conducting the fixation experiment in a hypnotic position the person was ordered to forget everything. Despite the fact that the person remembered nothing about this experiment, in a critical experiment he/she still misperceived the equal balls as different sized ones as a result of the fixed set. Other attributes of the set also indicate its whole-personal nature, for example, the quality of irradiation – the set fixed in one field, for example, in haptic field, is expressed in the optical field and vice versa.

We may think that the set is created as a result of repeated behavior. This makes sense for the part of psychologists (Luchins, 1942). However, according to Uznadze's theory, behavior cannot be preceded by set because the set itself is the basis of behavior. Repeating behavior in set experiments is a way that enables us to fix the appropriate mood. And the resulting illusion allows us to "see", to confirm the existence of specific behavior set that is unconscious. Thus, two types of sets

were expressed: the initial set and the secondary (fixed) set. In case of repeated behaviors, the initial set takes the form of a fixed set and passes to a latent position. In appropriate conditions, it is actualized and carries out appropriate activity. In result of long-term experimental study of the set, it has been found that transition from fixed illusory perception to the adequate perception has several phases – stages that are inter-individually different. These stages reveal the different types of alterations of contrasting, assimilative illusions and adaptive perceptions before finally moving to adequate perception.

Some researchers, for example, Luchins, say that the set is a hindrance to the behavior, because it leads to the inadequate behavior in a situation. In the Luchins' trial, a fixed attitude (set) hindered or completely ruled out the task (Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1959). From Uznadze's position it is perfectly clear, because as the set determines the effectiveness of behavior, it usually does not even appear in the act of behavior. The influence of set can only be noticed when it comes to conflict with the changing situation and causes inadequate behaviors. In order to illustrate this, A. Prangishvili provides such an example: the man who goes up the stairs will stumble if we remove one step. If all the steps were in place, the behavior would end so that the set did not reveal. However, when the set is in conflict with the changed situation (in case of step removal) it reveals itself in the inadequate behaviors of the subject (in stumble)(Prangishvili, 1967).

One of the most important things in Uznadze's theory is how reality comes into set, by what psychic resources, how it is reflected, and how it stays unconscious. According to Uznadze's theory, we see the objective reality reflected in the set at all different stages of psychic development. However, at each of these stages (including human) the structure of a set and the patterns of its activity are different, because they build upon different and specific psychic resources. Based on the results of analyzing rich ethological material, D. Uznadze's student D. Ramishvili concludes that "a living organism allocates some kind of agent, incorporates it into a perceptual process, and performs the stimulus function only under a certain system of relations"(Ramish-

vili, 1978). Systems based on the interrelated temporal and spatial dimensions represent genetically earliest systems that operate *hic et nunc* in given situation (The author cites Folkelt's example, when spider loses its capacity to recognize a fly outside the spider web and even experiences fear of a fly). It is logical to conclude that the modalities of feelings and sensations are activated in the presence of such relations system. Each species has its own system of relations, which helps the species to perceive either a benefit and a necessity or a threat in a specific event. However, mental perception systems have been developing and becoming more complex in the process of adaptation to a changed environment due to the flexibility and variety of new systems. Such relational systems form the structure of sets.

Language is the leading system of human orientation, according to the results of research carried out by representatives of the Uznadze's school. Language and words reflect not only the meanings of objects, but the whole system of relations, reflected in the social as well as individual experiences. The language constantly reflects the social experience that goes beyond the boundaries of individual existence, and tends not to be bound to the certain situation and the actual content of the consciousness. Systems formed on the basis of languages reflect the most common relations with the objective world. However, even though all the moments of this system are not conscious, they are actively involved in the life of a person – in the process of new reflection, in the current problem-solving task etc.

“In our minds, – writes James, – there is a constant struggle between the aspiration to maintain our ideas and the desire to keep them unchanged“. According to James, this is a conscious „striving“(James, 1983).

But no way can it be conscious with a two year old child, who when seeing the orange for the first time, says “ball”. This example illustrates the unconscious influence of past experiences on the perception and the importance of language. The past experience in the child's consciousness is represented by the word “ball”. At the first sight of the orange, he identifies it with certain signs of a ball. No one will start to

argue that the child came to that conclusion consciously confronting or considering the characteristics of the orange and ball!

The second example: When a person is equally fluent in two languages, let us say, Georgian and Russian, he will choose a language to talk to an unfamiliar person according to his/her appearance (situation), even if he did not consciously think about what language to speak. It is noteworthy that the words and language forms of the appropriate language will be activated in consciousness, even if he is not intentionally looking for these words. This behavior is determined by the set of speaking the appropriate language: on the basis of the speaking need, the subject will form the set to speak the language that corresponds to the perception of the situation.

The role of the relations reflected in the language is well illustrated in one particular form of memory or forgetting, which is called the phenomenon of the word on the "tip of the tongue". This phenomenon was humorously, but with a great psychological truth described by Chekhov in his narrative "Loshadinaia Familia" (A Horse Name). Some of the content (the doctor's name in Chekhov's story) is forgotten and cannot be recalled. This content (surname, foreign word, proverb, book or movie title) is no longer conscious, but it is still not lost to the person. A person knows which sphere this "forgotten content" belongs to. Namely, that the forgotten surname "Loshadinaia Familia" is related to the horse. In addition, when the other content is provided for help to remember, we exactly know that it is not the forgotten word. This is the set presented in the form of a system of relations fixed in the language and this way it exists in a memory. The hero of Chekhov's story felt that the forgotten surname was somehow related to the horse, but he categorically denied all the horse-related surnames (Trotter, Steed, Palfrey) which he was told in order to help him until he heard the word "ovios" (oats) and remembered the forgotten surname "Ovsov".

Since "the set is a modus of the subject – of a person as a single whole, it is therefore quite possible that the content of consciousness, which is formed on the basis of a certain set, disappears, whereas the

set continues to exist. This means that the past continues to exist not in the form of conscious traces or unconscious beliefs, but in the form of a set – relations system”.

The phenomenon, which is one of the classical examples of the priming, in contemporary psychological literature, is explained based on the theory of activation, according to which the arousal of the node relevant to one meaning leads to activating many nodes close to the content of this word. At the description level, this opinion sounds quite adequate. However, as noted earlier, this explanation is an analogue to the physiological or neurological process, but the above mentioned priming example requires psychological explanation; every time, when there is a need to reflect the content matter, necessarily emerge the psychological regularities whose function is a cognitive reflection. The concept of set and the set theory explain through the psychic processes, how the independent and external objects are reflected.

The fact that emotion has a special role in the process of reflection does not leave any doubt today. According to D. Uznadze the set is first reflected in the feelings or emotions. Here we necessarily recall the notion of Bartlett's attitude and schema, in which an emotional state helps the participants to recall the stories that were read during the experiment several months ago (Bartlett, 1932). On the basis of the emotional state or this attitude, the subject constructs a new structure of the story. If you recall the story of Bartlett, it is a fairy tale of the Indians, the ethnic group that is different from the English; the details of the story are strange and incomprehensible to the mentality of the Englishmen, but they manage to incorporate the content of the story in the relevant content (although not very precisely memorized), in Uznadze's words, in the relations system characteristic to the language. In the case of Chekhov's "Loshadinaia Familia", the set looks like an emotional state when the hero of the novel "feels" which surname corresponds to the forgotten surname and which one does not.

D. Uznadze's theory offers conceptual analysis of the unconscious influence of the past experience on the behavior and offers produc-

tive and progressive way for psychology to determine its mechanism, which will enable new research and new understandings of existing material.

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DIMITRI UZNADZE – “PHILOSOPHY OF WAR”

Marine Chitashvili

Dimitri Uznadze’s lifetime coincides with the turbulent period at the turn of the 20th century. If we follow Erik H. Erikson’s eight stages of personality development his young adulthood crisis takes place during the global crisis, World War I (WWI). Born in the Russian Empire, educated in Germany, a witness of the first republic of Georgia and one of the founders of the first university in Georgia, he lives a life of an internal migrant in the Soviet realm, whereunder the ideological pressure, one either has to adjust one’s thoughts to the imperial discourse, or to disappear.

All starts in 1921, when Uznadze turns into an ordinary Soviet citizen – an impersonal “fortune’s favourite”, who is happy [has to be happy] to live in the Soviet Union where “life is good and live is well”.¹

Dimitri Uznadze, who witnessed two world wars in the twentieth century, wrote an essay “Philosophy of War” (See pp. 67-92 in this book) during WWI, but during World War II, Uznadze, Academician of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, does not write anything.²

The scarce data on his biography perfectly fits into standard format of homo sovieticus – nothing about one’s personality; only a list of activities at the university, the Academy and the Institute of Psychol-

1 This phrase is from the poem “Fine” written in 1927 by Vladimir Mayakovski who committed suicide three years later. In original version this phrase reads as: “И жизнь хороша, и жить хорошо.”

2 It implies a similar essay as “Philosophy of War”. The second volume of the Academy of Sciences Psychology Institute’s works in Military Psychology relates to this topic. Also, on the initiative of Dimitri Uznadze and other scientists a psychic evacohospital – “Psychoneurological center” – was established in Tbilisi. (National parliamentary library of Georgia. Uznadze D.).

ogy, as well as his scientific achievement – the theory of set, which is qualified as a Georgian school of psychology already during his lifetime.

There is nothing about a person who worked on Henri Bergson (Uznadze, 1920) and Vladimir Solovyov,³ wrote works “Impersonalia” and “Internal Forms of Language”, wrote essays and published them in periodicals. A philosopher and historian by education, professor of psychology Tbilisi State University, academician of the Georgian Academy of Sciences on the one hand and such silence or inertia on the other ... It is not an original idea to conclude that Dimitri Uznadze’s civil silence or the disappearance of his personal biography is due to the circumstances rather than his personal indifference and/or his worldview.

“We have a purpose from birth which we must accomplish unsparingly. ... Our purpose is to accomplish the work started by God and experience world creation initiated by Him. And if this holds true, our endless and tireless work does appear meaningful, our life in time assumes profound significance, while the latter acquires religious value” (see pp. 76; 82 in this book).

It is difficult to judge an author and a text when there is no information available about the time and space in which the author lived and the text was created. Dimitri Uznadze’s biographical materials are not rich;⁴ neither did the author write about himself, nor have his students left any narratives about their teacher. The time that could have been used to reconstruct Dimitri Uznadze’s personality – according to the stories of his immediate students – is also gone. None of his students is alive, while the stories of his students’ students border on imaginations and might be misleading.

3 For V. Solovyov overview see reference (Philosophy of V. Solovyov).

4 I refer specifically to years 1914-18. However, information loss concerns Uznadze’s entire life. For example, the data of National Library notes that D. Uznadze was a member of the Socialist-Federalist Party since 1917, but does not specify when he quit. If we consider that the membership of any party in those times would guarantee the label of a “traitor of the homeland”, we should think that Uznadze was hiding this past. There is no reference to his party membership elsewhere.

The above mentioned limitations deduce the review of the essay “Philosophy of War” to several simple targets.

First, it is the content of the article, which is not directly related to psychology. The essay was written when Uznadze did not think as a psychologist but worked as a history teacher in the Kutaisi gymnasium (Javakhishvili, 2015).

Second, as the article was published within a few months from the start of WWI, it can be seen as a reflection of intellectual on open questions about war, death, the purpose of human and nation, the purpose of life and the meaning of life [meaning making], human behavior in a daily life and in extreme situations, the metaphysical and mundane reality of a person as the agent. Some of his arguments are convincing, while others may appear unacceptable or out-of-date, in the light of current social sciences, Uznadze’s reasoning and conclusions are not empirically grounded. However, it should also be noted that this is a sincere and unbiased reasoning of a person aiming to find the metaphysical meaning of his contemporary life by analyzing it and using the categories of purpose and values from the perspective of religious philosophy.

Third, what are the concepts and propositions of his philosophy of war that can be valuable today, and what are the concepts that are reflected and further develop in Uznadze’s psychological work?

* * *

Dimitri Uznadze’s essay “Philosophy of War” was published in November-December, 1914⁵ in the Georgian Socialist-Federalist newspaper “Sakhalkho Purtseli” (Public Papers). It consists of several chapters: *Death as Evil; Metaphysical Death is not Evil; Vladimir Solovyov’s War Philosophy; The Meaning of Life; A Person and the Meaning of Life; Nation as the Agent of the Meaning of Life; The Problem of War; Nation as the Agent of the Meaning of Life.*⁶

It should be assumed that this is the author’s first reaction to WWI. Paradoxically enough, Uznadze predicted Germany’s defeat

5 5 letters total. November 27, 28, December 3, 5, 10.

6 Uznadze names twice identically two parts of essay.

within five months after the war broke out: "... the ongoing warfare launched by the German government ... started as an offensive war but has taken a different turn, and it became clear from the very beginning that the defeat of the Germans would lead to the punishment and demotion of the entire German nation" (see p. 91 in this book).

The essay reveals the author's concerns and negative attitude towards war, which in fact ran counter to the common disposition in his contemporary Europe. As a historian Lasha Bakradze noted in a TV show "Red Zone", "*the war was met with admiration in Europe; among its supporters were Thomas Mann and Max Weber. Thomas Mann writes about Europe's decay and calls this war purification. Max Weber says that a great and wonderful war is ahead. [It is unfortunate that I cannot take part in it]*" (Gvakharia, 2014).

Bakradze elaborates on the same question in his lecture "Georgian-German Relations during WWI" and notes that the war was welcomed in Georgia only by a small group that saw it as a possibility to obtain cultural and/or political autonomy within the Russian Empire and a path towards Russia's democratization. Public attitudes towards the war were largely pessimistic (Bakradze, 2016). Unfortunately, the lecture does not specify who exactly had a pessimistic attitude.⁷

Uznadze is among the pessimists who disapprove of war in general. He is interested in the essence of war as a form of existence, how it gains importance and becomes a slaughter space for people when it is not necessary, and most importantly, how a war may become an arena for the accomplishment of the meaning originally prescribed to each person, as well as to nations.

Uznadze is trying to discuss war as a destructive human behavior from the viewpoint of religious philosophy, but his position is truly original, and I would say, slightly reformist, unlike Russian religious philosophy. While discussing Christian asceticism and Christian life-

7 Uznadze is in pessimist category with this essay, i. e. those who are not welcoming the war. However, his position is not limited to humanist and pacifist motivations – "Thou shalt not kill"; at the same time, he tries to understand why the metaphysical order is breached and a war begins.

style, he points out the purpose and aims of life and existence. He writes:

“It does not consist in the mortification of this world, but on the contrary, in its elevation and activation. Hence, its ideal lies in the earthly life and not in the next world. Thus, our idea of the meaning of life is to support earthly existence. ... Religion seems to descend from heaven. ... According to the Book of Genesis, man is the crown of creation. ... reconciling in a human being spirit and flesh, activity and passivity to the best measure” (see p. 81-82 in this book).

To substantiate the central argument of the essay – the destiny [purpose, value] of human life as the motivator of human existence⁸ – Uznadze starts his reasoning by analyzing the concept of death.

Death is commonly seen as absolute evil. It is the only thing that will definitely happen in one’s life – “every human is mortal,” regardless of merits, achievements, activities, needs and age. That is why, when we learn about a sudden death, we spontaneously respond with a question “but why?” which has a rather unclear or no answer. Common sense holds that death is evil and it is unacceptable. Uznadze qualifies this understanding of death as relative, which does not allow for the distinction between conventional and metaphysical meanings, or meaning in its pure form.

Uznadze finds this interpretation of death practical but not absolute. Absolute knowledge requires the understanding of metaphysical reality.

“Our mind only generates relative output, while our feelings are not responsive to absolute values” (see p. 71 in this book).

To this extent, the conventional assessment substantially alters during a war, which affects one’s attitude and death acquires a positive meaning.⁹ For Uznadze, a critical situation is needed to access the immediate meaning of concepts, and war is such a situation.

8 Live for Uznadze is a form of life and death, and both of them serve the purpose of live and existence.

9 (See p. 72 in this book) “the enemy’s death appeals to us as a pleasant and encouraging news”.

“Obviously, war entirely liberates our spiritual life from the preeminence of the categories of mind, thus paving way for our immediate, spontaneous assessments” (see p. 72 in this book).

The author proceeds by analyzing situations when murders committed in a war are qualified as chivalry, i. e. the meaning of the concept changes and depends on something else through which

“... the profound purpose underlying human existence is accomplished. ... From this perspective, death and life seem to acquire the same value for the accomplishment of this purpose: it is fulfilled either through death or through life. ... we should not seek the meaning of our existence within the limits of our [personal] life but beyond [and above] it” (see p. 73 in this book).

The metaphysics of death was not unknown to European and Georgian authors of the period. The definition of death as the main attribute of life evaluation was also familiar to Georgians.¹⁰ WWI will bring into the world death, as well as human “remnants”¹¹ and new challenges,¹² including the need to create essentially new services for human health.¹³ Sigmund Freud, who was not recognized in academic

10 „God save you, death, / you make life attractive, / you, death, become valuable due to adversities of life.”(Vazha – Pshavela. Memory [poem]).

11 [“remnant”] refers to people who survived with disabilities and traumas, and everything that turned into a public discourse, assessments, etc. concerning and connected to WWI all memories of missing people, stories and myths, etc. Everything that the war has left in people.

12 David Lawrence’s “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”, published in 1928, asks directly what to do with ideals when one has got a body and, moreover, why a lifeless body makes the character feel loyal not to love and the ideals, but to the norms of the society in which he grew up and which he has been avoiding since he was left with a motionless and non-functional body. Lord Chatterley’s character is the complication of Uznadze’s paradox on re-disintegration of the unity of soul and body in conflict with morality and later their break-up and conflict.

13 After the end of WWI, psychotherapeutic services started to be institutionalized. It was clear that war veterans who had no physical problems needed assistance to restore mental health. Nowadays the English Dictionary of Oxford explains psychotherapy as “the treatment of mental disorder by psychological rather than medical means.” (Oxford living dictionary). In 2012 the American Psychological Association adopted a resolution on the effectiveness of psychotherapy which uses John C. Norcross’ definition:

circles for his strange ideas and the range of the effects of the unconscious, will be asked by the Vienna University to give introductory lectures on psychoanalysis.¹⁴

It is noteworthy that the problem of human purpose raised by Dimitri Uznadze, and the role of physique in the shaping of determination is attuned to the discourse developing in the West in his contemporary period, which must have influenced the author’s ideas.

Uznadze is not ahead of his time, neither does he follow it, but is an integral part of it, being inherently anchored in the “here-and-now” of his contemporary period. He perceives the reality like others around him¹⁵, and tries to answer the questions: what does human purpose (self-determination) consist in? what does one have a conflict with: the dynamic between death and life, or one’s duty (i. e. self-determination) – one’s “mission”, which is to be accomplished in a changing setting, where values permanently change, have a relative nature and are determined by the unconscious, i. e. what is beyond one’s cognitive functions: aims, motivations, desires, needs, emotions, passions, feelings, lusts/longing.

Dimitri Uznadze’s work does not mention the word *unconscious*,¹⁶ but certainly refers to a condition which he defines as follows:

“Completely different is the unmediated assessment of the absolute essential nature of events that outbreaks spontaneously from the depths of our heart. Only this assessment is trustworthy and reliable” (see p. 75 in this book).

“Psychotherapy is the informed and intentional application of clinical methods and interpersonal stances derived from established psychological principles for the purpose of assisting people to modify their behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal characteristics in directions that the participants deem desirable” (APA, 2013).

14 Sigmund Freud delivered lectures on the “Introduction to Psychoanalysis” at Vienna University, in the winter semester of academic years 1915-1916 and 1916-1917 in the auditorium of the psychiatric clinic where the entire university would gather (Freud, 1933).

15 i. e. the intellectual and creative elite.

16 In his central work “Experimental Basics of Set Psychology”, he points out that the unconscious is an unnecessary notion and set takes its place (Uznadze 1961).

Uznadze needs this “unmediated assessment“ for several purposes: first, for the debate with Vladimir Solovyov and second, for the generalization of empirical experiences of short-term fixation of implicit determination in the immediate sense. This issue was addressed in Georgian philosophical anthropology by Giorgi Tsintsadze (Tsintsadze, 1982) and later Shota Nadirashvili (Nadirashvili, 2001).

Uznadze disagrees with Solovyov, who believes that since the metaphysical world is full of harmony and love, all the events, including war, convey some kind of goodness. Uznadze’s main argument is that there are unfair wars and there are also wars where the participants are either heroes or obstructionists [i. e. when a state starts a war which is unacceptable to its people].

It should be noted that Uznadze’s argument is not strong enough to criticize Solovyov’s philosophy because it is based on a concrete experience – in Uznadze’s words, nature and mind – and not on the metaphysical absolute predicate system. Nevertheless, the argument of the author, although weak, raises a new question about the meaning of life, or, in other words, the creation of meaning and its subjective nature.

When considering the meaning of life, Uznadze distinguishes between people who pursue enjoyment and those who are guided by a purpose.¹⁷ For him, purpose is objective and is there from the beginning.

According to Uznadze, people are aware of their implicit purpose, which is manifested as a concrete feeling and this is labor, work, and agency for the purpose.¹⁸ Work is always aimed at an outcome which should be achieved – behavior is oriented towards a target and

17 It is interesting to note that Uznadze speaks about cause-effect type of behavior in set psychology, but does not recall purposeful, intentional, goal oriented behavior, except in the study of the objectivation phenomenon. His “Philosophy of War” exposes a high degree of freedom of thought, expression and writing – back in 1914, Uznadze is free to speak about human purpose, divine order and the continuation of the work initiated by God by His successor, agent, anactive and creative person. Nothing like this can be found in his late works.

18 Uznadze addresses the historical argument for the justification of this provision. He highlights a large list of extraordinary individuals in the development of culture and civilization whose lives can not be estimated if

“we have a purpose from birth which we must accomplish unsparingly” (see p. 76 in this book).

Uznadze discusses the notion of development as a vector, which also comes from the implicit purpose.

“When we speak about development, we necessarily mean growth, creation of new forms and momentums. This kind of development is only possible in the absence of obstacles” (see p. 79 in this book).

Uznadze understands the material world as something given once and for all, which does not develop, because the basic principle of the material world or inorganic nature “... is the principle of matter and energy conservation” (see p. 79 in this book).

Uznadze explains the concept of development as follows:

“The logic of development implies the possibility of endlessness, ... pertains to the whole course of life” (see p. 79 in this book).

Uznadze believes in the principle of global activity, which is a necessary condition for development. He finds that this active moment is spiritual. According to him, soul does not remain unchanged; on the contrary,

“each new instance of a spiritual state is marked by the acquisition of a new content which adds to the old one. And this amazing quality of soul is best of all manifested in the faculty of memory. Soul becomes active on its own, automatically. It is an active momentum of universal existence... Therefore, only this active momentum can be the principle of creativity” (see p. 79-80 in this book).

Endless development, as understood by Uznadze, is determined by the fact that a person [i. e. “the agency of the soul”]¹⁹ transforms inorganic matter once she/he grasps its meaning, changes it, uses it and creates a new meaning. Thus, people are awarded by a creative impulse, which means that they [the “soul or active momentum of the universe”] (see p. 80 in this book) struggle against matter or passivity, which in fact generates the opportunity for endless development.

they are discussed pragmatically.

19 The words in the parenthesis were used by Uznadze.

Uznadze addresses the issue of the relationship between the psychic and the physical. The problem of psychophysical dualism, as a central methodological issue, remained unresolved after the establishment of psychology. For Wundt, only the process of consciousness was to be the subject of general psychology. He refused to accept anything from metaphysical psychology, which, in his opinion, did not provide methodological grounding to support a hypothesis.²⁰

In order to address the problem of psychophysical dualism, Uznadze proposed a concept of the unity of body and soul as realized in a human being.²¹ He writes:

“An example of animated matter is a human body: soul imbues each and every cell, rendering them animated and active” (see p. 80 in this book).

For Uznadze, the whole life is nothing else but the way in which the inanimate acquires spirit, and everything partakes in the world order and harmony, which he calls

20 However, it should be said that Wundt eventually established two psychologies: experimental and cultural. One part of the psychology of culture “Psychology of the People” was soon translated into English, thanks to which it is well known to the broader academic community.

21 “Studies on Hysteria” by Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer was published in 1895 (Breuer & Freud, 1895) and there would have hardly been anyone who was unaware of the conversed nature of hysteria. In other words, the embodiment of feeling and thus the creation of a new reality becomes an empirical fact. Freud directed psychology towards itself and established it as a self-sufficient science which does not need an external impetus [the homeostasis principle]. Being the unity of soul and body, a human possesses from birth an intent that directs his/her behavior – i. e. an intrinsic motivation to act in order to satisfy desires that range from vital needs to values. This model was followed by Abraham Maslow’s well-known Hierarchy of Needs. Uznadze is among the authors for whom a person is integrated and indivisible. While his initial grounding is religious philosophy, he does not change the central paradigm of understanding human behavior and calls it the set. For Uznadze, set is nothing else but simultaneous existence of a situation and the need to conduct a desired behavior. In other words, there exists a need that awaits an appropriate situation to be satisfied through a behavior. According to Uznadze, a need is implicitly present in a person to fulfill his/her purpose, i. e., a range of needs from vital ones to values, or the demand range from vital needs to values [“Here I stand. I can do no other”, attributed to Martin Luther].

„the idea of cultural creativity and the purpose of human life“ (see p. 81 in this book).

It should be noted that in this case, the paradigm proposed by Uznadze equally applies to an individual and the society to explain the rationale behind a human behavior as well as the nature of the world. With this postulate, Uznadze echoes liberal theologians who believe that Christ’s service adds harmony to the chaotic cosmos. Among the distinguished representatives of this movement is Granville Stanley Hall, one of the founders of psychology in the United States who believes that religion should not be taught dogmatically but with respect to a child’s age. A child needs to know what God tells him as much as he can (Hall, 1900).

The establishment of an active source [agency], or a human being as a creator, the same as the purpose of human life, as interpreted by Uznadze is defined by approaching the ideal of life and by caring and working for it. According to Uznadze, this is what gives meaning to life and this meaning is a category of religious value (see p. 81-82 in this book).

In the subsequent parts of the essay “A Person and the Meaning of Life” and “Nation as the Agent of the Meaning of Life”, the author tries to show that although a person is a creator, he/she is bounded in time and space (see p. 82-86 in this book). The limits of time and space prevent due accomplishment of the meaning of life as he/she [a person] depends on the environment and therefore his/her behavior is also determined by the environment. Environmental determination implies the conditions, capabilities, knowledge that are given here and now.

This means that the purpose also depends on the environment. According to Uznadze,

“the content which our consciousness acquired in the past influences the direction of its working and consequently, it is in this direction that our consciousness receives new impressions” (see p. 85 in this book).

In Uznadze’s reasoning, the existence of a person within a certain time-limits foregrounds public interests that convey shared aspira-

tions and interests and serve as the basis for spiritual unity, the ability to comprehend spiritual life from the same prism and the desire to arrange a common life.

“Therefore, his assessments and emotions is no longer just his: the complex entity of which he has become a part acts, thinks and feels in him” (see p. 86 in this book).

Uznadze returns to the topic of war and states that a war is led by a community and not by an individual. However, an individual, in turn, is incorporated into the society and is part of it, which makes isolated individual existence impossible; thus he/she conforms to the dimensions of the community. In other words, it means that common sense becomes important for a human behavior as it makes him/her a member of the community and he/she sees in this the accomplishment of his purpose. That is why the fear of death, which is inherent in a person, transforms [loses its first importance] and death becomes a way, a means, the aim to accomplish the purpose.²²

To sum up, in the essay “Philosophy of War” Dimitri Uznadze points out that human behavior is determined by a purpose and this purpose or meaning, which a person has given a certain value, overpowers even his vital needs, and the fear of death loses its power [the valency] and transforms into a means to accomplish the purpose, the meaning of life.

22 It is not surprising that nation is considered as the central agent. This is the period that precedes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the concept of modernity and even the dissolution of monarchies after the WWI. All of these are yet to come. Uznadze’s understanding of a person as a part of a nation and a nation as the creator of history is determined by the knowledge of his time and space. He writes: “The purpose of life is the continuation of the work of God – it is the inspiration and animation of the whole world, while the agent capable to accomplish it is the spirit of a nation” (see p. 87 in this book). It would suffice to revise the terms from today’s perspective and keep the rest of the statement unchanged to receive the following: *the subject, i. e. the agent creates the meaning of the environment and implements them as his own self-realization in the environment and thus changes the environment as more favorable for him.* Naturally, it is difficult to say whether Uznadze would agree with this interpretation today, but it is likely that he would try to convince us with more arguments to justify the nation as a meaning making entity in individual life.

Regrettably (and interestingly, at the same time) Dimitri Uznadze’s later works, which make up his theory of set, discuss human behavior only in terms of expediency and does not cover the issue of intentional behavior. The purpose of conduct in this essay is only a modus of practical consciousness for the author and not the central paradigm of human behavior. Uznadze’s aim is to focus on a goal-oriented behavior as having a certain value and a human activity targeting a certain purpose. There is no need to mention that a person’s choice of a particular set of values from a broader range raises the problem of creating meaning in the agent’s behaviour.

The issues addressed in Dimitri Uznadze’s work, which was published in a newspaper, were later developed in his psychological theory to expand the concepts of the denial of psycho-physical parallelism, the functional tendency, the expedient behavior mechanism, objectivation, the influence of the past [priming], the motivation, the interpretation of the importance of behavior, the development and the multi-layer structure of the behavior forms, and intrinsic motivation.

Uznadze’s essay “Philosophy of War” presents him as a follower of Wilhelm Wundt, for whom psychology is “entire experience in its immediately subjective reality” (Araujo, 2016). Uznadze will try to develop this provision throughout his entire life.

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